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The article analyzes the relationship among epistemic communities, symbolic geographies, cultural diplomacy, and Cold-War politics in the Balkans. It historicizes the hegemonic internationalization of Southeast European studies from the periphery. The epitome of this phenomenon was the International Association of Southeast European Studies (AIESEE). This organization was an environment where regional scholars tackled perceived marginalizations and re-ignited pre-1945 traditions. It was a framework within which academics negotiated their societies’ and cultures’ Europeanness among three symbolic pillars: the ‘Balkans’, the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. It was also a stage where epistemic multilateralism was a proxy for political entanglement.

There were four spaces of institutionalization within the AIESEE. First, there were its leadership dynamics – who were the most prominent decision-makers within the association. Second, there were the local specialized institutes and, more generally, national communities involved in the production of knowledge about the Balkans in world and continental contexts. Third, there were AIESEE’s specialized commissions, laboratories of transnational regional narratives. And fourth, there were the international congresses of Southeast European studies – pinnacles of international academic-political exchange. The hegemonic aspect underlying the evolution of these four spaces was that they were constantly managed by Balkan academics. The study focuses on the first three spaces of institutionalization, only hinting at the role of the fourth.

The objective of my approach is twofold: to reveal the mechanisms of institutional hegemony; and, to characterize some of the outcomes of this phenomenon. The study concludes that AIESEE established itself...
as the locus of Balkan episteme’s projection of “counter-circulation” into the general context of Cold War humanities. It was the springboard for the dissemination of knowledge that rehabilitated, de-colonized, and de-marginalized the Southeast beyond the Iron Curtain. Within AIESEE, scholars found a *modus parlandi*. It reflected varying degrees of historiographical peaceful coexistence and trans-localism as conduit for particularisms.

Keywords: Cold War, UNESCO, AIESEE, Balkans, communism, post-colonialism, periphery.

**Introduction**

In the first half of 1960s, as the Cold War evolved from a hot phase (the Cuban missiles crisis or the building of the Berlin Wall) into the mellower decade of détente, Southeast Europe experienced an ambivalent process of systemic and scholarly entanglement. At the political level, the different regimes in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey gradually began to explore possibilities for bilateral relations. Simultaneously, leaders would recurrently strive for an ever-eluding multilateral arrangement that could complement and even evade bipolarism. At the level of expert knowledge, the new environment would prove fertile for the formulation of regional identities that synthesized postwar re-imaginations of national communities with larger institutional and discursive frameworks (post-colonialism, Europeanization, or UN-inspired inter-governmentalism). The epitome of the interaction between diplomacy and politics of culture in the Balkans under circumstances of widening practices of emancipation from ideological hegemons was the International Association of Southeast European Studies (AIESEE).

The present article discusses some aspects of what I call the hegemonic internationalization of Southeast European studies from the periphery. This phenomenon translated alterity among individual states, between Balkans and Europe, and within the international contexts of the Cold War. It was a distinct European self-narration in a post-colonial world. This academic collaboration was a form of projecting local knowledge by way of re-institutionalizing area studies from within the region onto a global stage – UNESCO or the International Committee for Historical
Sciences (ICHS). The stages of this process echo the politics of international engagement of various Balkan regimes from 1960s onward. The dyad academia-politics generated specific conceptualizations about the place and role of the Balkans in postwar cultural, political, and ultimately historical hierarchies.

There were four spaces of institutionalization within the AIESEE. First, there were its leadership dynamics – who were the most prominent decision-makers within association. Second, there were the local specialized institutes and, more generally, national epistemic communities involved in the production of knowledge about the Balkans in world and continental contexts. Third, there were AIESEE’s specialized commissions, laboratories of transnational regional narratives. And fourth, there were the international congresses of Southeast European studies – pinnacles of international academic-political entanglement. The hegemonic aspect underlying the evolution of these four spaces was that they were constantly managed by Balkan academics. Western and North American scholars and politicians undoubtedly played a crucial role in the fate of Southeast European imaginations during the Cold War. Just as UNESCO’s agenda did as well. However, local episteme held the leading role within AIESEE’s activities, often in direct connection with their own regimes’ diplomatic agendas. Though I will not develop this idea here, it remains to be analyzed whether this hegemony over a nominally international institution generated a certain disconnect between scholarship about Southeast from within the Balkans with area studies from outside the region.¹

Due to space limitations, the article will deal with the first three spaces of institutionalization, only hinting at the role of the fourth. It will show how the high profile local scholars within the AIESEE made their mark on the outlook of the organization. It will briefly historicize the steps taken to found the association and its connection with national specialized institutes. A significant section of the analysis will sketch the outlook of AIESEE’s commissions in order to configure the main topoi advanced during this internationalization from the periphery. The objective of my approach is twofold: to reveal the mechanisms of institutional hegemony; and, to characterize some of the outcomes of this phenomenon.

The timeframe chosen covers a little more of a decade of the functioning of the AIESEE. I do not claim to exhaust all the complexities of the Balkan politics of cultural dynamics during his period. What I do try is to define and describe the characteristics of an international emancipation of local
episteme by way of pinpointing some of its most typical institutional and discursive manifestations.

**Political Context**

From mid-1950s, de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence opened the possibility of geographies in Europe complementary to the East-West divide. The available spheres of contact for countries within the socialist bloc significantly diversified. Inevitably, the seemingly impenetrable Iron Curtain started to conceal “multileveled interaction ... between different types of actors, between people, institutions and states”. The veneer of bipolarism obscured “relatively free space[s] where dealings with others were determined only by the rules set by the parties involved themselves”. These lower-level actors, below the great powers’ arena, engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation, which quite often ran counter to the ambitions of the bloc leaders. A former communist deputy minister of foreign affairs and minister of education in Romania, Mircea Malița, confessed that he learnt, at the time, that the new conditions favored those who created their own smaller international organizations and those who, within the existing international framework, “could launch themselves in the orbit of civilization”. All bets were off, as countries, aligned or non-aligned, scurried to take advantage of the intermediary, multipolar spaces of the Cold War.

Southeast Europe became the center stage of a sort détente avant la lettre. After the tensions caused by the Balkan pact (1953) and by the possibility of NATO nuclear presence in the region and/or in the Mediterranean, Bulgarian and Romanian proposals (1957-62) concerning the possibility of the Balkans to be a geographical area of non-proliferation proved, to a certain extent, to be an ice-breaker. The discussion however really got going on the path to regional cooperation after the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, in September 1960. Romanian communist leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, backed by Todor Zhikov and Josip Broz Tito, put forward a project of resolution entitled “Regional actions concerning the advancement of good neighborly relations among European states belonging to different socio-political systems”. It would be finally approved at the General Assembly in 1965. The foundation of this initiative was the idea of a Balkan entente that “did not presuppose giving up on [military] alliances to which the states involved belong” and
which, as a form of multilateral relationship among Balkan countries did not exclude bilateral relations about which he was rather optimistic.\textsuperscript{4} Or, as one official of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared to a Greek journalist, “we are generally interested in the continent we live in, where two world wars took place. But first and foremost, we are interested in our region, in the Balkans”.\textsuperscript{5}

The local circumstances were inauspicious at first. From late 1950s and during early 1960s, Macedonia was, and it would continue to be throughout the Cold War era, the sore point and source of conflict among Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In 1962, Yugoslav and Greek ministers of foreign affairs signed a gentleman’s agreement that basically settled, at the official level, the minorities’ question between the two countries until 1980s. In 1963, Zhivkov officially proclaimed that that there was no “historic Macedonian nation”.\textsuperscript{6} This basically set Bulgaria at odds with any scholarly/cultural discourse coming from Skopje. It is not surprising that in 1969, in a conversation with Nicolae Ceausescu, Tito stated that he was most worried by the “situation at the border with Bulgaria, because Bulgarians are evermore aggressive, incessantly negating the existence of the Macedonian nation”.\textsuperscript{7} Indeed, the dispute over Macedonia proved to be a factor of permanent tension especially between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Between 1968 and 1979, the political leaders, not only the historians, of these regimes were entangled in highly acrimonious disputes.\textsuperscript{8}

Starting with 1964, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s position toward Greece and Turkey followed a constant path of expanding cooperation. This development was eased by the beginning of what would later be called the long European détente, but also by local developments in the two non-socialist countries. Turkey truly stands out: in the aftermath of military coup-d’etat of 1960, both the Gürsel government (which was a caretaker government installed by the officers that deposed Adnan Menderes’ regime) and those led by the Justice Party (which dominated the decade) proclaimed the return to Kemal Ataturk’s principles in foreign policy. Among them the idea of Balkan cooperation figured prominently. Under the circumstances, Greece had to pursue its own rapprochement with socialist countries in the area lest it would face isolation. After the 1960 settlement in Cyprus, the relationship between Greece and Turkey experienced several crises generated by this long-standing bilateral issue: 1963/4, 1967, 1974, or 1983. Just like Macedonia, Cyprus remained one if not the most outstanding obstacle to political multilateralism in
the Balkans. Albania was *l'enfant terrible* of regional cooperation. Until 1960 its leadership fully supported the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Soviet initiatives for a weapons’ free region of peace. But, as Enver Hoxha broke away from the Moscow center, his regime began to consistently oppose any form of political multilateralism, including the Helsinki agreements. However, this attitude did not prevent the local regime from engaging in 1971 in covert negotiations (endorsed by the UN) with Greece. As a result, Greece renounced any territorial claims to Albania.

Throughout 1960s, a pattern developed: multilateralism at governmental level proved unachievable. It was replaced with a web of bilateral agreements that basically fuelled Balkan political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Southeast Europe seemed to find its place in the détente’s world through what I would call an “ambidextrous internationalism”, to borrow Mark Mazower’s concept. This specific form of interaction combined entanglement based on bilateral relations determined by long standing national issues and/or bipolar alignment with affirming regional agendas in trans-systemic environments. During the decade, maybe the harshest test to it was the colonels’ dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974). After the initial isolation of the regime, by 1969, the Greek minister of foreign affairs, P. Pipinelis, approached his socialist colleagues about “the possibility that Balkan countries, on the basis of a platform founded on ideas generally agreed, to actively contribute at the drafting of the agenda of the Conference for European security”.

Such partnership was premised on the axiom that “the membership of Balkan states to different political and military treaties must not be discussed, as this issue is not an obstacle on the path of fruitful cooperation”.

Indeed, the ambidextrous internationalism characterizing Balkan politics was, for all parties involved, a convenient mechanisms to supplant existing bipolar alignments and to create a stronger lobby for the countries in question in the negotiations that led to the Helsinki agreements. It is therefore unsurprising that when the idea of political multilateralism resurfaced – Greek prime-minister Konstantinos Karamanlis’ initiative of inter-Balkan conferences – it was described as “the first true implementation of the Helsinki spirit”. Ultimately, the ever-elusive political multilateralism reflected an ethos common to all regimes in the region: co-operation was a means to mitigate the super-powers’ influence and to carve out autonomous interests in the context of détente. Or, in Karamanlis’ words, “the fact that we know we can have such close cooperation even with rival systems lessens our need to depend on others”.
The Path to AIESEE

The principle of good neighborly relations advanced by the UN resolution in 1961 materialized in the creation of national committees of Balkan cooperation and understanding. They first met in Athens in the aftermath of the meetings of the UN Assembly. In 1962, at the second meeting in Sofia, two themes were discussed: “peaceful coexistence in the Balkans” (the Bulgarian proposal) and “activities for developing Balkan cooperation” (the Greek topic). The Romanian account of the meeting hardly suggests a spirit of mutual understanding among the participants: “the suggestions of the draft presented by the Greek delegation are generally impractical. Most of them have a general character; they are exclusively the responsibility of governments or are obviously unachievable”. The Bulgarian statement contained “tactless evaluations” about the relations between Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey, on the other. At the same time, it seems that the conclaves of national committees were considered by Albania a potentially viable forum of Balkan dialogue. After not being invited at the second meeting in Sofia, Albania issued an official complaint. The Romanian observer noted the absence of references to what he called “the Albania problem”.

One palpable result was the emphasis on “actions with non-governmental character” as mechanism of regional cooperation. The Greek delegation recommended “the method of using experts (scholars) for drafting studies concerning the possibilities of collaboration on multiple levels”. They went as far as to propose the creation of an institute of Balkan research with representations in each of the participating countries and the organization, that year, of a conference on Balkan culture under UNESCO’s aegis. Greece seems to have triggered a certain emulation across the region. Since 1953, in Thessaloniki, there already was an Institute of Balkan Studies, which was initially an offspring of the Society for Macedonian Studies (1953). From 1960, this institute had its own review, Balkan Studies, which was simultaneously published in Greece and the United States, thus insuring the wide projection of local scholarly discourses.

The Greek example re-opened the issue of (re)foundering local institutes of Balkan studies, which had had an honorable activity during the interwar period. According to Austrian historian, Erna Patzelt, there was in Yugoslavia a project to re-create a Balkan Institute in Sarajevo, which would continue the tradition of the pre-1945 one in Belgrade. But, the death of P. Skok (1956), who along with Milan Budimir had been the
editor-in-chief of the previous institute’s highly influential review, and of H. Barić (1957) made the realization of this project doubtful.\textsuperscript{16} This initiative will be revived again in 1963. Similarly, in November 1960, Gheorghiu-Dej approved a plan for the re-founding “the Institute for Balkan Studies and Research”. The Romanian leader also sanctioned the organization of a regional “conference of intellectuals” with the theme “the Balkans, a land of peace”. The event was supposed to bring together “prestigious Balkan personalities from the field of economy, culture and science”.\textsuperscript{17}

These early discussions coincided with two other endeavors, which can be considered stepping stones for AIESEE’s creation. The first is the influence of already existing cooperation in the field of Byzantine studies. The relevance of this factor can be exemplified by findings from the archives of the Romanian Academy. A delegation of this institution participated in April 1961 at the creation, in Weimar, of the German Society for Byzantine Studies. Upon its return, the head of the History Section, C-tin Daicoviciu, wrote a letter to the Presidium of the Academy in which he stressed the importance of developing this field of research. The initial stage was to send, few months later, a larger delegation (over ten people) at the International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Ohrid (Yugoslavia). According to the document, all socialist countries funded and encouraged this academic field. They were also sending to Ohrid fairly large delegations. The example was Bulgaria, who was represented by 15 delegates.\textsuperscript{18} A second initiative that set the ground for AIESEE was the organization of the first meeting of university rectors from Balkan and Adriatic countries (1961). The participating countries were Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Italy. No less than twenty seven universities were involved.

By early 1960s, the idea of academic multilateralism as a proxy for the political cooperation had gained significant ground across the region. The only element that was missing was an international stage that could transgress local or even continental divisions. This was the UNESCO. The Greek and Romanian idea of a conference of Balkan intellectuals would materialize in 1960 at UNESCO’s Eleventh General Conference. Two years later, during the Regional Conference of European UNESCO National Commissions in Sofia, the last details of a colloquium on Balkan civilizations will be ironed out. In July the same year, the event officially entitled “Unity and Diversity of Balkan Civilization. Contribution of the Balkan world to the relations between East and West” will open its doors
in Sinaia (Romania). It brought together representatives from sixteen European and non-European countries.

The Creation of AIESEE

The Colloquium in Sinaia was the founding moment of AIESEE. The peculiar name of the event can be explained by the fact that it was sponsored by UNESCO within the Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Value. This program was launched in 1957 as a reply to the ebbing flow of de-colonization. Initially, it was supposed to provide a framework for “Asian and Arab states in the process of defining and redefining their national identities to present their cultural values as not only distinct from but also on an equal footing with Western cultural values”. I will not dwell extensively on the profile of this Major Project and its impact on the conceptual input that it provided to Balkan scholars. The Major Project managed to democratize the space and span for the study of exchanges, influences, and adaptations from Europe to sub-regions, regions, world traditions (Orient and Occident). It placed *le genie propre* of each people at the center of its understanding of culture and civilization (none of them normatively explained). It therefore created an environment highly conducive to “enshrining the ‘invented traditions’ of nationalist historiography”.

The shadow of the Major Project loomed large over the event in Sinaia. The UNESCO representative was N. Bammate, the head of the Section for Philosophy and Human Sciences of the Department of Cultural Activities. More importantly, he was also the Chief of the Coordinating Unit for the Major Project. Also present was Ronald Syme, the general secretary of the International Council for Philosophy and Human Sciences. During his intervention in the proceedings, Syme advanced the idea of creating “a space for Balkan studies”. Such project ideally would evolve into a non-governmental entity facilitating academic exchange beyond ideological and national borders. Once the proposal was on the table, things were quickly set in motion. By the last day of the gathering, the organizers had prepared a resolution calling for the creation of a provisional committee charged with taking the necessary steps, locally and internationally, for the founding of “an international institution for Balkan studies meant to promote scientific research in the field of human sciences within the Balkan and Southeast European region”. Only four
months later, during UNESCO’s Twelfth General Conference, the Draft Program and Budget listed a grant of $25,000 should be made for the establishment of an International Association of Balkan Studies and for the implementation of scientific work for 1963-1964.23

Indeed, on 23 April 1963, AIESEE came to life in the Romanian capital. Bucharest hosted its General Secretariat, position held by Emil Condurachi. Along with specialized institutes in some of the member countries, AIESEE will function as the core institution for the project of Southeast European studies and as maybe the most visible and glamorous materialization of trans-systemic Balkan cooperation during the Cold War. It initially brought together specialized national committees or institutions from fourteen countries (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Great Britain, Romania, Turkey, Hungary and the Soviet Union). By its ten-year anniversary, other four joined in (GDR, German Federal Republic, Poland, and the United States).

AIESEE’s leadership was elected by an International Committee and it formed the Bureau of this committee. The former was made up of representatives of all the affiliated national committees, two from each of the core countries and one from each of the others. It would meet every two years, than later on every four years. Between its meetings, the association’s coordination was the responsibility of the Bureau of the international committee, which comprised one president, four vicepresidents (later eight upon AIESEE’s expansion), a general secretary and a treasurer. The last two positions will be soon held by the same person. The president could only be a scholar from the core countries and the position was held by rotation.

The first president was Dennis Zakythinos, whose biography reinforces, among other things, the influence that Byzantine studies had on the internationalization of Southeast European studies. From 1960 until 1975, Zakythinos was head of the Institute for Byzantine at the National Hellenic Research Foundation. He was also General Secretary and then President of the International Association of Byzantine Studies. At the time of AIESEE’s creation, he held, in Greece, the position of deputy prime-minister. Throughout the years, he served in Parliament and held various ministerial positions. He rose to academic prominence during 1950s, when he advanced the thesis of Byzantium’s preponderant association with the West. His scholarship played a central role in the debates of the 1960s and 1970s about the validity of the continuum Ancient, Byzantine, and Modern Greeks.24
The second president was Bulgarian linguist Vladimir Georgiev (for his biography see below), followed by Croat medievalist Franjo Barisic. Between 1971 and 1974, Halil İnalcık, maybe the most prominent Turkish Ottomanist, held this position. When his mandate expired, next in line was Albanian linguist and cultural historian, Androkl Kostallari. He refused to take the chairmanship, probably because the Albanian regime did not want to have one of its representatives hold the leadership of an institution (even a nongovernmental one) founded on the principle of multilateralism. After deliberation within the International Committee, Bulgarian historian Nikolai Todorov became president. He was a compromise solution, as his nomination avoided the possibility for a Greek scholar to hold the position. The Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974) had generated within the AIESEE calls for the exclusion of Turkey from this institution.

The highly prominent positions held in their own countries by the various members of the AIESEE’s leadership point to a fusion between scholarship and diplomacy. The general secretary, Emil Condurachi, who was also a representative of the pre-1945 epistemic traditions of Romanian Southeast European studies, was one of the three most important historians in the country. He was head of the Institute of Archeology (until 1970) and vice-president of the International Academic Union. Alecs Buda, initially AIESEE’s treasurer and one of its vice-presidents, was the most influential historian in Hoxha’s Albania and the founding president of the local Academy (1972). Nikolai Todorov, the head of the Institute of Balkan Studies in Sofia, reached ever new heights during the 1970s and 1980s in the political-epistemic hierarchies in Bulgaria. Between 1970 and 1972, he was director of the Institute for Foreign Policy at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was twice elected a candidate member of the central committee, in 1981 and in 1986. From 1979 to 1982 he was general secretary of UNESCO’s International Information Centre on Balkan History (funded by the Bulgarian Academy). In 1985, he presided in Sofia the 23rd session of UNESCO’s General Conference.

From the beginning, the leadership of the association was very ambitious. It initially sent invitations of association to institutions from thirty countries. The replies did not presuppose immediate affiliation for two reasons. In some countries, scholars prepared first the creation of national committees of southeast European or/and Balkan studies. And, specialists from several others adopted a wait and see approach, which they would later forfeit as the AIESEE proved its sustainability. Furthermore, the association admitted the possibility that there would be countries where
there were no national specialized committees or institutions. It allowed for scholars from such places to be affiliated as non-voting members. This clause of its statute allowed the participation at the association’s events of scholars from countries that one usually does not associate with the Balkans: Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, Ghana, Japan, South Korea, etc. With this in mind, I would argue that the AIESEE did achieve a highly international profile, if not even a global one.

According to article 3 of its statute, the association would specialize on “the advancement of Balkan studies and, more generally, of the study of Southeast Europe in fields of the humanities such as: history, archeology, ethnography, linguistics, philology, literature, folklore, the arts, etc. from the earliest until present times”. This clause hints to an academic mission premised on a teleological view of human and collective development in the region. As it would become apparent from the activities and publications of the association, for the scholars from the core countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romanian, Turkey, and Yugoslavia), the AIESEE will become a framework for unearthing and certifying sets of evolutionary permanences of local communities. These permanences were building blocks for identity narratives projected internationally in the larger epistemic exchange under the association’s umbrella.

The AIESEE was the space where regional academics, and I am paraphrasing here a Bulgarian literary historian, liberated themselves from the putatively “suffocating” influence of “a ‘Western Europeanism’ that simply … continues to treat them [local cultures] as poor relatives that, of course, do not know how to emancipate themselves”. Denis Zakythinos made the aim of the institution even clearer: it had to escape the tradition of ‘Balkanism’, which he envisaged both as prejudice-loaded knowledge about the region and as proliferation of nationalist historicisms. Instead, he proposed that the association would pursue a wider geography mindful of the Balkans connections with “old Europe” and the Near East or with the countries at the Pontic, Mediterranean and Carpathian periphery. For this purpose he did not consider the new institution as Balkan, but as southeast European.

Under the circumstances, the association had to focus on two trajectories of integration: first, a regional one, which circumscribed the area as “a community of material and spiritual life, of economic, social, political, and cultural phenomena […] a community established by History”. And second, it had to flesh out the Balkans’ place within “the general unity of human societies”. With this permanent dichotomy in mind, the AIESEE’s
activity would configure “what we received and assimilated, what we created ourselves, all which resulted in an original synthesis that holds an honorable place among the general accomplishments of humanity’s history. But we did not only receive. We also gave. We transmitted farther that which he have created, that which became ours by way of putting our imprint on it”. The AIESEE was an arena not only for disciplinary emancipation, but also an international locus where originalities and syntheses could be formulated, expounded, and legitimated.

At the end of the day, regional scholars attempted to discover the developmental models and the historical specificities. These simultaneously set them apart and integrated them in UNESCO’s new vision of a world concert of cultures. They also situated local societies in l’Europe des patries, which was the Gaullist continental vision of a continuous cultural space from the Atlantic to the Urals. The epistemic multilateralism of the AIESEE was supposed to reflect UNESCO’s own vocation of universality. In 1973, the Director-General, René Maheu, in a conversation with Nicolae Ceaușescu, defined the mission of the international organization:

UNESCO plays an important role in aiding developing countries to construct national policy, to invent models and not to imitate the models of developed countries. In this way, multilateral activity is different from the bilateral one. In bilateral relations one often tends to practice import-export of models. We though help them to find their own models.

Regional Outlook

The starting point for mapping AIESEE’s institutionalization is the fact that it began as an associate institution within the Major Project. Accordingly, its functions were “to respond to: (a) the need for more comparative studies of cultures; (b) the need for an interdisciplinary approach in the study and presentation of cultures;” and, c) it was not supposed be geographically confined to pre-determined groups or zones of culture. While administratively working on a national basis and in a regional framework, it had to focus on area studies without ignoring any of “the many tinges and varieties, and respecting the essential characteristics, of the various cultures concerned”. The AIESEE as an “associated institution” would promote, “on a systematic basis and
thorough a concerted program of scholarly works and publications, study of civilizations and their mutual interaction within a broad regional context, with special emphasis on their evolution and achievements”.34

Under the circumstances, during 1960s, the process of institutionalization of Southeast European studies in the Balkans would follow two directions. First, the creation of the AIESEE triggered a region wide process of founding specialized institutes. In Romania, in 1963, a new Institutes of Southeast European Studies is created. Its head was historian Mircea Berza, whose biography made him, like many other scholars in the region involved with the association, a direct transmitter of pre-1945 traditions. He had been a student of Nicolae Iorga and, more importantly, the closest collaborator of historian Gheorghe Brătianu, the head of the Institute of Universal History after Iorga’s assassination. Brătianu was the first local scholar who transplanted the methodology of the *Annales* school in local historiography. Moreover, before his untimely death (1962), a central figure in the creation of the new institute during communism was Victor Papacostea, the former director of the Institute of Balkan Studies (1938-1945) and a central figure in the regional school of Balkanology.

A year later, in Sofia, an Institute of Balkan Studies was created under the directorship of Nikolai Todorov, a product of the new socialist epistemic establishment in Bulgaria. There are in this case too prominent examples of continuity of pre-war traditions. The second AIESEE president, linguist Vladimir Georgiev, the vicepresident of the Bulgarian Academy, had been socialized in the academic environment from before 1945. He taught at Sofia University during 1930s. His mentor was Veselin Beseliev, one of the most important local scholars in Thracian studies, who held the chair of classical philology at Sofia University (from 1932). In 1964, he would become the head the section of ethnography and historical geography at the new Institute of Balkan Studies. Georgiev and Beseliev will spearhead the organization, under the AIESEE umbrella, of the first International Congress of Thracology (1972).

In 1969, an Institute of Balkan Studies would be created in Belgrade, under the leadership of Vaso Čubrilović. During early 1940s, he advocated for ethnic cleansing as a mechanism of solving the minorities’ problem in Yugoslavia. The founding of this institution was rather protracted. According to Dimitrjie Đordjević, the general secretary of the Yugoslav National Committee for Balkan studies, the project was initiated in 1963. It was supposed to be an all-Yugoslav, that is, federal institution. In the end, it would only be under the umbrella of the Serbian Academy of
Sciences. Đorđjević himself is an interesting case. His family was part of the Belgrade pre-1945 elite (his uncle, Aleksandr Belić was president of the Serbian Academy). He fought with the Chetniks during the war. He was imprisoned for a while in Tito’s Yugoslavia (similarly to Victor Papacostea in Romania). In 1970, he took a professorship position at University of California in Santa Barbara. It seems that in the early years of AIESEE’s activity, the towering Yugoslav figure, besides Croat medievalist Franjo Barisic, was Jorjo Tadić. Before the establishment of the communist regime, Tadić held the position of full professor of modern European history at University of Belgrade. By the beginning of 1960s, he chaired the most important institutions of history production in Serbia, including the Historical Institute and the Department of History.

An Institute of Balkan Studies and Languages was created in Tirana under the chairmanship of Androkli Kostallari. An Institute of Southeast European Research was founded in Edirne in 1970. A year earlier, it had functioned as an autonomous branch under the umbrella of Istanbul University. This institutional network notwithstanding, the AIESEE also relied in the core countries, on the involvement of other institutes of the local Academies. In the case of Greece, an institutional actor of importance equal to the institute in Thessaloniki was the Royal/National Hellenic Research Foundation (Athens 1958) with its Institutes of Byzantine and Neohellenic Research. Similarly, in Turkey, the Turkish Historical Society held the coordinating role for the country’s scholars in AIESEE’s activities. The institutes in Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, and Edirne had their own specialized reviews: *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes, Etudes Balkaniques, Balcanica*, and *The Journal of South-East European Research*.

The second direction of institutionalizing AIESEE was the creation of specialized commissions of research. These were basically the lungs of the organization, the main venues through which research in various branches of southeast European studies was coordinated and synthesized from national contexts to international, multilateral activities and programs. There were 8 such commissions: of archeology, led by the M. Garašanin and officially created in Sarajevo (May 1965); for the study of post-Byzantine art, chaired by Manolis Chatzidakis and its first session was in Thessaloniki (April 1966); of economic and social history, presided by N. Todorov (Sofia, 1965); for the study of the history of ideas, led by M Berza (December 1965); for the study of popular songs (i.e. folklore), chaired by Zihni Sako, the director of the Institute of folklore in Tirana (June 1966); for
the study of Ottoman archives (it first met in 1967 in Istanbul) – its initial president was H. İnalçik, who was replaced by Ömer Lütfi Barkan, who himself relinquished the position in 1972 to historian Tayyib Gökbilgin; and, for the study of the substratum of Balkan languages – it first met in 1967 and was headed by Vladimir Georgiev. Last but not least, there was the Commission for the study of the Balkans in the contemporary period presided by the president of the Turkish Historical Society, Enver Ziya Karal. This latter body has a tumultuous history. It took almost four years for it to come into being (1971-1974). The chairs of each of these commissions were exclusively scholars from the core countries.

What should be apparent by now is that Balkan academics did set the tone in the functions and programs of the AIESEE. They adjusted UNESCO’s recommendations and the interaction with scholars from Western Europe, North America, and other countries from North Africa or the Middle East to regional and national agendas of knowledge production. The results were epistemic constructs that claimed to realign, in past and present, Balkan societies with a view to established historical, cultural, and political continental and world hierarchies. Or, as M. Berza proclaimed at the rostrum of the IIIrd Congress of Southeast European and Balkan Studies in 1974: “in the last decades, we have made immense progress toward the enlargement of our cultural horizon, in our understanding of the past, which following older attempts to escape the former Eurocentrism translated into a fortuitous ‘dearistocratization’ of history”.38

**AIESEE’s Commissions and their Topoi**

To get a better idea about the internationalization of regional and national agendas in the framework of the AIESEE, one needs to take a closer look at ideas formulated within the specialized commission. At the beginning, these bodies organized internal seminars that were meant to clarify the respective research programs and methodologies. However, in 1969 such practice became secondary. That year in Plovdiv (Bulgaria), the commissions of archeology and linguistics had the initiative of organizing an international symposium on the ethnogenesis of the Balkan peoples. The impact this event had within AIESEE as well as UNESCO’s reaction imposed it as model for future activities. It officialized the practice of interdisciplinary conferences that brought together at least two
commissions or individual representatives from the multiple components of the association.

The aims of the commissions of archeology and linguistic are apparent from the proceedings of the Plovdiv symposium. The organizers produced a memorandum endorsed by all participants. Two of its clauses stand out:

2. The demographic composition and changes in civilizations are not equivalent notions. There are civilizational changes without fundamental ethnic alterations. […] 3. New facts in a civilization can be considered as local development or transfers via migrations or they could as well be the products of cultural influences. Every case must be studied on the basis of concrete information.\(^\text{39}\)

These statements implied a regional agreement on the continuity of autochthonous populations. It also pointed to the predominance of indigenous contributions to civilizational change, which trumped any constructive external influence. The two topoi, continuity and nativism, would become pillars of the activity of the commissions of archeology and linguistics.

Another essential topos was that of the Balkan societies as “main cultural hearths (foyers) (Kulturlandschaft)”.\(^\text{40}\) This feature of the region was postulated at the Sinaia colloquium. The secretary of the Romanian UNESCO national commission, literary historian Tudor Vianu emphatically stated that “the Balkan region proved to be one of the most ancient and complex cultural regions in the world”.\(^\text{41}\) A year later, Em. Condurachi would find the most enduring formulation: “this [Balkans] ancient meeting place, a genuine stepping stone that brings together the Mediterranean and Central Europe, reinitiating, under novel circumstances, the millennial dialogue between the Orient and the Occident”.\(^\text{42}\) Such unsurprising view of the region did however trigger an entire agenda of research.

The participants at the Plovdiv international symposium on the ethnogenesis of the Balkan peoples unanimously reached the conclusion that the region was the homeland of two grand civilizations: the Thracians and the Illyrians. They were the original autochthonous factor that came into contact with the ancient Greek-Roman civilization and later with other migratory groups. There were two important caveats to this idea. First, the Thracians and the Illyrians had been indo-European from the very beginning, that is, the original populational groups that came to form them. In fact, several participants claimed that “the localization
of the main center of the formation and the expansion of the common indo-European must be placed in the Northern Balkans and south of the Danube”. V. Georgiev defined the specificity of the ancientness of the Balkans in contrast with other regions of Europe. He contended that three conditions facilitated the study of Balkan peoples’ formation and ancestry in contrast to the rest of the continent:

1. we have plenty of information about the Balkan Peninsula since most ancient times; 2. there are here the names of tribes, places, and persons that can be dated since the thirty-fifth and thirty-second centuries [before Christ, n.a.]; 3. Most of the Balkan languages, such a Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian, Serbo-Croat preserved quite well the phonetic structure of the words. [...] On the contrary, it would be very difficult or impossible to claim this for France, England and Germany...

The foundation of Balkans’ ancientness, autochthonous development and continuity was what the head of the archeology Commission, M. Garašanin called “the Balkano-Anatolien civilization”, which basically brought together all the putative ancestors of the area’s peoples.

Before turning to the commission for the history of ideas, I believe it is important to point out that a possible organizational model of this body might have been the Association for the Study of the Greek Enlightenment. Created in 1962, this latter institution had “to define and to compile a systematic register of all data relating to the Greek intellectual legacy, in whatever represents ‘Greek space’ and ‘Greek time’”. By “Greek time” the members of the Association meant that “all periods of Greek History, with no interruptions, have left traces in modern Hellenism. Consequently all these periods fall within the scopes of the Association...” And, “Greek space” meant that they argued that while focused on the Greek peninsula, their interests extended “over much larger areas than those comprised in the historical frontiers of Hellenism”. This epistemic ethos of writing intellectual history by way of a nationally holistic vision of time and space carried over to the AIESEE’s commission.

Another tremendous influence from Greece on this Commission’s production of knowledge was the work of historian C. Th. Dimaras on “modern Greek enlightenment”. Dimaras emphasized the fact the grand European intellectual currents are made up of their national components, which can be historicized only once they reach their evolutionary course. This insight was based on a theory of cultural reception that reflected
a symbolic economy of “offer and demand”: “the receptor chooses whatever suits its needs….the process of influence is … the expression of a conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious inclination”. Such give and go eliminated any possibility of subordination between the Orient and the Occident.

During the Commission’s first meeting in Bucharest (December 1965), the participants decided that the goal of this body was to tackle “theoretical problems such as the notions of humanism, Renaissance, Enlightenment, romanticism, etc. and the chronology of these currents” in the Balkans but in a European context. The principle behind their activity was to go beyond the East-West divide. The commission studied the extent to which the cultures in the regions synchronized with the great trends of European socio-political thought and how they developed national versions of each of them. The premise that founded such scholarly program was a democratization of continental intellectual history as “these region has been unfairly forgotten among the wonderful development of old Europe”. Regional scholars perceived their endeavor as a reconstruction of national traditions often obscured if not altogether absent in general accounts of European history. It advocated a new symbolic geography that on the one hand was unequivocally proclaimed as European, while on the other hand was invoked in order to debunk “the myth of Western civilization as the civilization par excellence”.

Despite the fact that the Balkans “had lived in zones of high culture”, scholars did admit that by the beginning of the 17th century, the area was lagging behind the West. But this backwardness was anachronistic for two reasons. First, the West itself represented only a minority or a limited phenomenon in comparison with the still dominant old oriental civilizations. Second, “Southeast Europe was moving en recul in comparison with the standards set by its own civilizations”. But once the intellectuals of the East entered into contact with the ideas of the West, starting with the 17th century, a new phenomenon came about:

the European education…coexists superficially with strictly local problems [original emphasis, n.a.] generated by pressing political and social issues. This particular ability to target the Enlightenment from the West upon regional problems… is the manifestation of the Southeast European genius.
With this in mind, Romanian historian Virgil Candea, wondered whether “these Southeast intellectuals were in fact the last men of the Middle Ages and the last humanists of Europe or, if one prefers, the most recent ‘moderns’ in European thought”.54

The Berza Commission set out to accomplish a “grand synthesis” based on studying both individual cultures and general European movements of ideas. In 1972, Al. Dutu, one of the most prominent Romanian scholars within the commission’s activities, argued that “in the Southeast the formation of national cultures is not synchronic, but diachronic”.55 He along with his colleagues considered that, in the multiplicity of Balkan syntheses, individual cultures/civilizations produced their own historical tempos based on the origins, plasticity, and the impact of the permanences of each and every of them. What was initially a restorative historiographical enterprise transformed, despite its innovative approach and methodology, into a potentially competitive quest for exceptionality. Modern national culture was the last phase of a series of syntheses based on the creative assimilation within an ever-expanding tradition of Western and global influences. Genuine modernity became the incarnation of the continuity and development of tradition.

The commission for the social and economic history was the institutional locus for conceptualizing the relative backwardness of the Balkans on the path to modernization. More often than not, the Todorov Commission defined backwardness either in terms of Ottoman exploitation or on the basis of capitalism’s irrepressible march to imperialism and socio-national exploitation. Two topics dominated its activities: the study of Balkan cities and the penetration of capitalism in the region. The head of the commission contended that during Ottoman rule, in Southeast European societies, “the dominant nationality”, by which he ambiguously meant both “the Turks” and “the dominant Ottoman class”, “remained outside of the development of the forces of production”. Its main contribution was “an ever more encroaching bureaucracy”. In contrast, “the subjected peoples were the promoters of capitalist relations”.56 Under the circumstances, between the 17th and 19th centuries, “the developed forms of capitalist economy…did not appear in these countries despite the existence of favorable economic premises with advanced money-goods relations”. This statement brings forth a corollary: “the contradictions between the forces and modes of production” mixed in with national contradictions resulted in “the unprecedented intensification of the latter”.57 Southeast
Europe’s inability to follow a ‘normal’ path to capitalism was rooted in the Orient parasitic presence in the Balkans.

The second factor of relative backwardness was apparent from the commission’s discussion of Europeanization. The latter was a processes synonymous with the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the development of capitalism in the region. These synchronic processes would however become sources of decalage because

the possibility to profit from the experience of the most advanced countries depended on the conditions existent in the countries that made a delayed transition to capitalism. There are very few cases when the latter took advantage in a rational fashion of such experience.\(^{58}\)

As the modernization process was underway, “European capitalism profited from its supremacy in order to reduce to the state of colonies or semi-colonies not only the countries detached [from empires, n.a.], but entire continents”.\(^ {59}\) The looming specter of foreign capital combined with the region’s stunted development imposed an “intrinsic (asynchronous) backwardness”. Echoing the finding of the coommision for the history of ideas, backwardness from the point of view of social-economic history became the inability of “real forces and the ‘legitimate’ possibilities (virtualités ‘légitimes’)” of Southeast European societies to take hold of their respective national modernizations.\(^ {60}\)

There was a flipside to these argumentations about the connection between internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire and the penetration of capitalism in the Balkans. Important sections of Turkish historiography tied the ‘corruption’ and ‘decay’ of the Ottomans to three main factors: the effect of disaggregation that the economic and political presence of Great Powers had on the empire; the development of Balkan nationalisms; and, the alliance between semi-colonial capitalist influences from the West and so-called “compradore” nationalities (e.g., Greeks or Armenians). One of the outcomes of this narratives was that, mirroring Todorov, “non-Muslims have been equated with the capitalist class, nourished by the capitulations. In the struggle against this class, every means seems to become legitimate, and even the principle of general equality becomes suspect as if it were an imperialist trick”.\(^ {61}\) Ironically, just as Todorov associated decalage with the Ottoman/Muslim ‘parasitic’ presence, Turkish historians produced discourses of underdevelopment because of the ‘parasitic’ attitudes of other ethnic groups.
In the end, for the academics associated with these commissions, the negotiation of Europe in the Balkans meant the historicization of specific visions of national modernity. The latter was as European as the one from West. But it was defined by ‘original spiritualities’ and often by the rejection of capitalism as a civilizational model. Nevertheless, the anti-Westernism of scholars from the core countries of AIESEE was not an attempt to find an alternative to western culture or civilization. I believe that Samuel Hirst’s diagnosis of Turkish and Soviet anti-Westernism during 1930s fits very well with the type of conceptual emancipation of Balkan episteme within the AIESEE. These scholars aimed “to rewrite the western order in such a way that the European periphery would gain equal, and perhaps even preeminent, membership”. They were committed “to importing the content of European progress while shedding the forms of European domination”.62

The commissions on post-Byzantine art and folklore followed interpretation mechanisms inspired by the theoretization proposed by the commission of history of ideas. That is, the evolutive interplay between tradition and innovation was structured in favor of successive syntheses. The latter enriched the originality of regional cultural-historical manifestations in the arts or in folklore.

The commission for the study of the Ottoman archives was used as a medium by Turkish scholars to consolidate their involvement within AIESEE. Though present from the beginning in the association’s activities, this country’s representatives increased their profile especially during 1970s. Unsurprisingly, this process also coincided with Halil İnalcık tenure as AIESEE president. Generally speaking, one can identify two goals of their interventions in the organization’s debates. First, they aimed to subvert the dominant historiographical topos that equated the Ottoman Empire with backwardness and oppression. Second, they constructed an imperial history that situated the Ottoman tradition within European context and on par with either the West or with the Byzantine Empire. Such a reformulation of historical, political, and cultural lineage consolidated Turkish civilization pedigree in the continental and world concert of cultures. Following the tradition of Fuad Köprülü (who incidentally was minister of foreign affairs in Turkey between 1950 and 1955), highly visible scholars such as Halil İnalcık, Ömer Barkan, or Tayyib Gökbilgin argued that the Ottoman empire was its own creation. It was not simply a continuity or ‘parasitic’ adaptation of the Byzantine empire.

Barkan, along with İnalcık, rejected the Marxist theory that the Asiatic mode of production was applicable to the Ottoman empire. They also
questioned the Annales school thesis of an Ottoman feudalism equivalent with the Western one. İnalçık also emphasized that the Ottoman empire had been “a commonwealth founded by Turks, but built by Arabs, Greeks, Slavs, and Albanians along with its Turkish founders”. One can identify two main instruments of critique of the West among Turkish historians involved within the AIESEE. They either reconsidered the imperial tradition thus re-inserting the Ottoman heritage in larger international and continental civilizational hierarchies. Or, in an interconnected way, they adopted approaches inspired by world-system theory or post-colonial critiques of the West aimed at overcoming earlier cultural and historiographical peripheralization.

The year 1970 was a turning point from the point of view of how UNESCO envisaged AIESEE’s research priorities. Starting with the budgetary year 1971-972, AIESEE had to study the Balkans as “pathway of cultural communication between Mediterranean Europe, the Slavic world, and Asia Minor”. Moreover, its programs had to turn their attention toward more contemporary topics and problems. As this article does not deal with the specific dynamics of the association’s congresses, I will turn to the second aspect of UNESCO’s recommendation. It set the ground for the creation of the commission for the study of the Balkans in the contemporary period.

In April 1971, N. Todorov organized the international conference “The Politics of Great Powers in the Balkans before the Second World War”. At the end of the event, he argued that the issues discussed pointed toward a future research program centered on Great Power involvement in the region before and at the beginning of World War II. In July, Soviet historian A. F. Miller proposed the creation of a body, within AIESEE, that would tackle various subjects pertaining to the study of the interwar period. Miller did specify that “the commission would not only cover the field of history per se, as it would also deal with cultural history, literature, economic history and sociology”. A year later, during a meeting of the International Committee, this proposal was hotly debated. According to Condurachi’s report to the RCP Central Committee before this gathering, there was a great deal of apprehension within the association toward the Soviet-Bulgarian project: “by their very nature, contemporary issues could trigger polemics and constitute a source of conflicts”. The Romanian delegation was to adopt a positive attitude in this matter pending the reactions of representatives from other core countries.
Subsequently, in 1972, it was decided that a group of specialists (A.F. Miller, G. Castellan, E.Z. Karal, Ch. Fragistas, A Buda, I Sanders, Em Condurachi) will draft the program of the new commission. The following year in Moscow, the main themes of this body were sketched. Among them were:

1) the contribution of Balkan countries to peace efforts in the interwar period;…4) the contribution of Balkan countries to the development of contemporary education, science, science (paying attention in particular to the celebration of eminent personalities representative for the science and culture of Southeast European countries); …6) the development of state and juridical institutions in Southeast Europe during the modern and contemporary period…

I chose these three examples in order to point out that the new commission followed a similar emancipatory pattern as the others within the AIESEE. It recuperated national traditions in European context, which in itself was highly impactful on the re-assessment of the pre-1945 period within socialist historiographies. It also opened the door to conflicting narratives of state and cultural progressivism.

Conclusion

AIESEE’s institutionalization and implicitly its internationalizing functions were not a one-and-done phenomena. During 1970s and 1980s, the association evolved in relation with the dynamics within the UNESCO and the national establishments of knowledge production from the core countries. A fundamental instrument for the structural and conceptual evolution of the institution were the congresses of Southeast European and Balkan studies. They were supposed to take place in one of the cities of AIESEE’s core countries: Sofia-1966, Athens-1970, Bucharest-1974, Ankara-1979, Belgrade-1984, Sofia-1989.

The very possibility of these congresses, and indeed of AIESEE itself, can hardly be imagined without crucial developments within the International Committee of Historical Sciences. The International Congress of Historical Sciences in Rome (1955) was a turning point. For the first time during the postwar, historians from the socialist bloc participated. The congresses in Stockholm (1960) and Vienna (1965) were landmarks that revealed a
turning tide. On the one hand, Western historians were challenged from the point of view of multiple historical materialism-inspired discourses. On the other hand, and more pertinently to the topic of present article, national(ist) historicisms made their presence felt.\[71\]

One can argue that the AIESEE was an offspring and a textbook example of the re-emergence, within the ICHS, of a sort of “ecumenical community of historians” to use Karl Dietrich Erdmann’s term.\[72\] Undeniably, détente and the internationalization of the humanities brought about a new spirit of cooperation between East and West (then North and South). Nevertheless, strong ideological differences persisted. What developed within the ICHS, and particularly within the AIESEE, was a modus parlandi, if not vivendi. It reflected varying degrees of historiographical peaceful coexistence and trans-localism as conduit for particularisms. The epistemic common ground founded on the imperative of overcoming peripheralization allowed the simultaneity of cooperation and competition among national narratives and scholars.

AIESEE was an environment where regional scholars tackled perceived marginalizations and re-ignited pre-1945 traditions. It was an institutional framework within which, taking advantage of their hegemonic positions, these academics negotiated their societies’ and cultures’ Europeanness among three symbolic pillars: the ‘Balkans’, the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. AIESEE triggered the (re)founding of specialized institutes and academic reviews. It allowed epistemic elites to acquire continental and even global prestige through their leading positions within the UNESCO-sponsored association, by way of the organization’s congresses, and ultimately through carrying regional/national agendas into international historiographical discussions. AIESEE established itself as the locus of Balkan episteme’s projection of “counter-circulation”\[73\] into the general context of Cold War humanities. It was the springboard for the dissemination of knowledge that rehabilitated, de-colonized, and de-marginalized the Southeast beyond the Iron Curtain.

Ironically, AIESEE’s demise during 1980s and early 1990s reflected the embeddedness of Balkan academic-political cooperation into the very same Cold War realities it tried to evade. The historiographical peaceful coexistence upon which AIESEE’s modus parlandi was based came under attack. The ‘aggressor’ was a radicalization of the very same topoi that had been initially formulated within it (e.g., the specialized commissions). This phenomenon was intertwined with increasingly fragile bilateralism/multilateralism because highly volatile topics such as security, territorial claims, or minority rights rapidly came back on regional agendas.
NOTES

1 This insight is also inspired by Diana Mishkova’s comparison of Southeast European studies in the West with those from the Balkan countries in “Academic Balkanisms: Scholarly Discourses of the Balkans and Southeast Europe,” in Roumen Daskalov ed., *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, vol. IV (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).


9 Mark Mazower uses “ambidextrous internationalism” in order to describe United States evolving attitudes toward the UN. He emphasizes the fact that American foreign policy was not either realist or idealist. “Most of the time it was both, and for the pragmatists in charge the true realism involved using international institutions where possible.” See Mark Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea* (London/New York: Allen Lane, 2012), p. 277 and also p. 294.


11 Ibid., f. 36.


Marinescu, “A doua întâlnire...,” f. 4.


The document was read by writer Camille Aboussouan, the general secretary of the national Lebanese commission for UNESCO. For details about the membership of the provisional committee see “Séance clôture des travaux du colloque” in Commission Nationale Roumaine Pour L’UNESCO, *Actes du Colloque International de Civilisations Balkanique* (Sinaia, 8-14 July 1962), p. 189. Bammate called the resolution a “natural, spontaneous” result of the participants’ dialogue during the event (p. 193).


For example, Leandros Vraoussis, the director of the Center for Medieval and Neohellenic Studies at the Academy of Athens, made such a statement in an interview at the national radio-station “National Progress” on August 23, 1974. In Arhivele M.A.E., dosar 241/1974, 14.S.41, f. 128.

Papers Series (Sofia: Center for Advanced Studies, 2007) and Todorov’s obituary in The Sunday Times, October 2, 2003 (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1100971.ece).


37 For a more detailed analysis of the (dis)connections between pre-1945 and post-1945 institutional and personnel structures in the field of Southeast European studies in the Balkans see Mishkova, “Academic Balkanisms…”


For an initial formulation of this idea see Milutin Garašanin, “La contribution du monde sud-est européen,” *Sources archéologiques de la civilisation européenne*, Actes de la colloque international organisé par le Secrétariat général de l’AIESEE, Mamaia (Roumanie), 1-8 septembre 1968 (AIESEE: Bucarest, 1970), p. 103.


Ibid., pp. 217-218.

Ibid., p. 184.


Ibid., p. 135.

Ibid., p. 125.

Ibid., p. 144.

Georgescu, “La terminologie…” p. 117.

See Taner Akçam’s criticism of discourses about non-Muslims within Turkey as described in Hercules Millas, “Non-Muslim Minorities in the


66 For a comprehensive analysis of Turkish historiography during the Kemalist period and from 1950s until 1990s see Büşra Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal Decline,” 115-154 and Millas, “Non-Muslim Minorities…” in Adanir and Faroqhi (eds.), The Ottomans and the Balkans.


72 Ibid., p. xiv.

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