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This volume was published within the Human Resources Program – PN II, implemented with the support of the Ministry of National Education - The Executive Agency for Higher Education and Research Funding (MEN – UEFISCDI), project code PN–II– RU–BSO-2014

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ISSN 1584-0298

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ART AND POLITICS IN MODERN DICTATORSHIPS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE AND EASTERN EUROPE
A Preview of Theoretical Problems

Abstract

This article introduces the comparison of the relationship between art and politics in ten dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania), and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay). The specific analysis concentrates on the 1970s and the 1980s when the two regions were ruled by dictatorships, either inspired by communism or anti-communism (Doctrine of National Security). The article provides an overview of the main theoretical issues in studying such diverse regimes by focusing on their institutional frameworks. The tentative conclusion is that these regimes are not only comparable, but also similar in several respects.

Keywords: art and politics, modern dictatorships, South America, Eastern Europe.

Art is a product that has to be sold and not given away. Why one pays for shoes and not for a sonata of Beethoven? Secondly, art should be managed with the same techniques of 'marketing' that are used to sell a refrigerator or a blender...

Cesar Sepúlveda, vice-president of the BHC (Vial) group, one of the two most important economic groups of Chile

The art and letters people must also have a program. I know some people say: literature and art cannot be planned. To tell you frankly I do not consider that impossible. [...] As we demand to produce goods of consumption and technical goods at the level of the request, we have the same pretensions in art.

Nicolae Ceaușescu, 1971
Introduction

The research project Art and politics in modern dictatorships in the Southern Cone and Eastern Europe investigates the relation between the dictatorships in Eastern Europe and South America in the 1970s and 1980s and their respective artistic spheres with a focus on visual arts. This article presents a brief introductory overview of theoretical aspects of this analysis.

The ten cases considered in this research project include in the Southern Cone the dictatorships in Argentina (1966-1973 & 1976-1983), Brazil (1964-1985), Chile (1973-1989), Paraguay (1954-1989), and Uruguay (1973-1985); and in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria (1944-1989), Romania (1948-89), Hungary (1944-89), Poland (1945-89), and Czechoslovakia (1948-1989). Because these regimes have different lengths, this project only considers the 1970s and 1980s, when they were contemporary, and taking into account the broader developments in the case of the regimes that were already in place at the time.

The analysis is an extension of my doctoral thesis, which compared Chile during the Pinochet regime to Romania under Ceaușescu in the period 1970s-1989; now, I include other cases so as to amend or confirm my framework of analysis. These two regimes represent the extremes of a range of governments. Their dissimilarity is seen both ideologically, communism versus “Doctrine of National Security”, and in the role assumed in the artistic field, by the state in the case of Romania, and respectively the market in Chile. We are confronted thus with two dissimilar regimes that adopt opposed strategies. Different strategies that have the same purpose: control and direct artistic manifestations. However, the effects they produce on the artistic sphere are similar: unavoidably, art is created in relation to the political. The two regimes are alike in so much as they imagine political projects with a totalitarian turn, but the strategies they impose on the actors differ.

This type of comparison between the East and the South, between East European communist regimes and authoritarian regimes in South America while marginalized by political science, has already been addressed by art history. The exhibition, which also published a catalogue, Subversive Practices Art under conditions of political repression 60s-80s/South America/Europe, edited by Iris Dressler and Hans D. Christ shows how, in both regions, the artists’
subversive potency and political relevance were expressed in very different ways, yet they indeed coincided in one common point: in the creation of free spaces of thinking and agency, in smaller or larger collectives respectively. Although opposing different regimes with contrasting mechanisms, they reach the same point, that is, they show how the political power can be subverted, and how, the stronghold on power has its limits and margins of possibilities.  

The purpose of this comparative endeavor is to establish a framework of analysis of the relation between art(ists) and politics in modern dictatorships, other than the totalitarian ones. This comparative perspective allows for interesting parallels, for example between the Ceaușescu regime in Romania, and the Stroessner regime in Paraguay (1954-89), both being analyzed in terms of sultanism and acknowledging their common use of the nationalist discourse, as well as the extended cults of personality despite their ideological opposition, communist versus anti-communist. The analysis is multilayered and organized from multiple perspectives, and theoretical approaches. Regime theory is the first important theoretical resource. The analysis employs the concept of modern dictatorship as a common heading/framework from which to study the relation with the art of regimes. To examine the artistic strategies of the regimes, it is important to study what does the state do, in terms of regulations, institutions and cultural policies, and also use the theoretical resources provided by the interdisciplinary approach of the study of the relationship between art and politics. The qualitative comparative method is used to confront each time the details concerning each national case. Thus, this is a political science investigation using a comparative politics approach to study the relation between politics (power, institutions) and art. The research focuses on the case of visual arts, called plastic arts in Eastern Europe, (which include increasingly in the period analyzed, new mediums as photography, video, installations, performances, situations, art actions, the human body, etc.), but looks at the general framework of the artistic spheres depending on the country. The meanings of political art are dramatically different in distinct dictatorial contexts: sometimes only small gestures, details, versus very bold acts of resistance and critique of the regimes. It is this diversity that this investigation wants to underline and discuss.

In what follows, this article recalls some theoretical landmarks used in the comparative analyses of the modern dictatorships with an accent on
the theoretical framework of analysis of the relationship between art and politics in general, art and politics in totalitarian regimes, and the different panorama of this relationship in authoritarian regimes with an addendum on the cultural policies of the authoritarian regimes in South America.

**Modern Dictatorships**

Two important claims are central to this investigation. First, that authoritarian regimes and totalitarian regimes are not only comparable, but also similar in so far as artistic strategies are concerned. This is underlined by the use of the common denominator of modern dictatorships as a term that highlights the commonalities along the evident differences between the two regimes.

I argue that comparing such different case studies helps decipher the relations between political power and artistic expressions that develop in dictatorial settings, and that cut across the left/right and the authoritarian/totalitarian categories. Romania and Chile embody the extremes of imaginable studies concerning the subtle relations connecting art and politics in modern dictatorships. Therefore, no sign of equivalence is placed between the two. Analyzing them in terms of modern dictatorship is done in the line of the studies that, departing from a comparison of the totalitarian regimes tried to establish a common ground of analysis of postwar non-democratic modern forms of government. Stemming from regime theory, the concept takes into account the theorization of Juan Linz that introduced authoritarian forms in-between the twin formula of democracy-totalitarianism, advancing a tripartite framework of analysis (democracy-authoritarianism-totalitarianism). As Franz Neumann observed, we still don’t have a systematic study of dictatorship. Modern dictatorship was a term used in the interwar period to describe the new types of autocratic rulership, but was later abandoned by the literature that privileged primarily the analysis of “democracy versus totalitarianism”.

Juan Linz introduced a third type of regime, authoritarianism considered different from totalitarianism or, on the contrary, as a “milder” variant of it. But, as Linz wrote, “the effort of conceptualization and comprehension of the range of authoritarian regimes” was forestalled by the “tendency to study political systems inside cultural or geographic areas”, or by the propensity to “regroup countries such as the communist regimes of Eastern
Europe” while ignoring their comparison with other non-communist authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{13}

One of the first to use the concept in the sense used here was Hermann Kantorowicz (1935) who defined modern dictatorship as a government “which is autocratic; works through dictation; and in which the governed still remember a less autocratic or less illiberal former system”.\textsuperscript{14} The dictator was either “an individual or a group: in the first case we speak of personal, in the second of collective dictatorship” and modern dictatorships were of three types: military, party, and administrative dictatorship.\textsuperscript{15}

Referring to the specific case of Eastern Europe, several authors have underlined the input of citizens in their analysis of the communist regimes or the state socialist countries in Eastern Europe; this participatory/participative approach could take into consideration the Southern Cone regimes. Specific analyses of the GDR case are the most advanced approaches of this type. Mary Fulbrook uses the notion of participatory dictatorship so as to emphasize how “the undoubtedly dictatorial political system was ‘carried’ by the active participation of many of its subjects...The East German dictatorship was one that managed to involve large numbers of its citizens in its political structures and processes”.\textsuperscript{16} In the same sense is coined the formula by Martin Sabrow of people’s dictatorships which are not people’s democracies, “based on a shared or forced identification between the rulers and the ruled.”\textsuperscript{17} They are based on a form of “‘consensus dictatorships’. This type of rule was marked by cooperation, and understanding between above and below, between the avant-garde, and the masses, the leaders, and the led, and the party, and the people. The acceptance of dictatorship was created, in large part, by this kind of consensus building – by conviction, repression, and (self-)deception, in short by the creation of a particular form of historical and social reality.”\textsuperscript{18}

This type of analysis centered on a bottom-up perspective makes clear how dictatorships are not only imposed from above through coercion, but are also durable because of the collaboration, or participation of a certain degree of some parts of the citizenry. This aspect is particularly relevant for the East European regimes, and the politicization of art, as well as for the Southern Cone examples, that most often demand an apolitical art.

The purpose of this approach that uses modern dictatorship supports the theorization of non-democratic regimes in terms of different degrees of control of power and not as fundamentally different forms of government. This is done by showing, for example that the Pinochet regime had an explicit program for controlling the arts, and that even more so, the
free-market policies it applied to the artistic space altered its functioning in similar ways to the communist, state-centered model. Therefore, it is rather a difference in the degree of control exerted by the respective dictators, than a fundamental difference in the intentions of the programs they enforced.

A modern dictatorship entails a varying process of centralization and control upon society: milder or stronger depending on the distance it displays to the authoritarian or totalitarian poles. Cultural activities are also affected when artistic freedom disappears, and the political power imposes an exclusive, mandatory discourse. A modern dictatorship imposes an official art – an official vision on art. To ensure its predominance, this entails a process of monopolization of all cultural activities, ideologically through the control of discourses that emanate from the political power personified by the dictator, and institutionally. This process also includes the dissemination of this official version to which artists must comply. To enforce it, regulations and norms are imagined, institutions are set in place, and mass-communication means are activated. To express this view artistic education is also used, so as to create, and disseminate the new ideology on art.

The second statement is that art provides a space where other discourses than the officially sanctioned ones can be formulated, and the study of these discourses can prove fruitful for political science approaches to modern dictatorships. This analysis provides proof that, studying arts in dictatorships offers a better understanding of these regimes, by a look at their modalities to conceive art, their functioning, and their inbuilt inconsistencies. Examining artistic expressions created during the dictatorships is also helpful for our understanding of how people feel living under a repressive regime, as often artists are able to transmit these shared feelings through a figurative language. This second line of analysis is not discussed in this article, which only refers to the theoretical aspects of studying such diverse examples of modern dictatorships.

The Dictatorships in Eastern Europe and South America

In the 1970s from the ten Latin American countries of South America only two did not experience a military regime, Colombia and Venezuela. The authoritarian regimes in South America are contemporary and inscribed in the same general logic of the Doctrine of National Security
or the Ideology of National Security which developed under the influence of the Superior School of War in Brazil, and with the help of the very influential manual *The geopolitics of Brazil* (1966) written by Golbery do Couto e Silva. The Doctrine of National Security (DNS) was imagined in the context of the Cold War as a strategy to limit the influence of Marxism in Latin America (especially after the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959), and identified an internal enemy that had to be eliminated, through repression and economic development, which would prevent the success of Marxist ideas. Increasingly during the military regimes, the enemy became anyone that opposed the military’s conceptions.

The military coups d’état in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966 and 1976), Chile (1973), and Uruguay (1973) were organized as a reaction or a preventive measure taken to stop the influence of populism or Marxism, guerrilla movements, or democratically elected socialist presidents as in the case of Salvador Allende in Chile. Seen as short-lived military interventions as other previous ones in several countries, these developed in what Juan Linz and other authors such as Guillermo O’Donnell, have called “bureaucratic-authoritarian” regimes so as to underline the collaboration between civilians and the military. In this sense, the military allied with civilian sectors to put into place several reforms that they deemed, on the basis of the DNS, essential for the purging of their societies, and for the restructure of their political regimes. Furthermore, also based on the DSN was the collaboration of these dictatorships in the secret Operation Condor, which saw the cooperation between the secret services of the five dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay), together with Bolivia, and later on joined by Peru and Ecuador in the 1970s. Condor targeted their respective internal enemies on the territory of the neighboring countries, and even in the US or Europe. It was organized under the control of the secret police in Chile, National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), and its chief Manuel Contreras with the support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Despite this ideological perspective, the regimes followed national paths. For example, Chile and Uruguay (1918-1933, 1942-1973) had a strong democratic tradition compared to their neighbors. The respect for democratic institutions was higher in these two cases, thus the complete surprise of the long dictatorships (17 and 12 years respectively) they endured starting in 1973. The Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship (1954-1989) in Paraguay was a personal dictatorship, the longest after the one of Fidel Castro in Cuba in terms of length, although ideologically completely
opposed to the former. Thus, several of the decisions concerning the cultural sphere were imagined before the other countries in the Southern Cone. The Stroessner dictatorships also developed an intense cult of personality of the leader himself that was less present in the other regimes, which emphasized the military character and symbols, with the partial exception of the Pinochet regime in Chile, which increasingly became a personalized regime. In Argentina (1966-1973 & 1976-1983), on the other hand, the military dictatorships were collective governments (juntas), which saw the dominance of the first military leader, Juan Carlos Ongania for the first one (1966-1970) and Jorge Videla for the last military dictatorship (1976-1980). In Uruguay (1973-1985), differently than the other Southern Cone dictatorships, the first leader was in fact not a military, but a democratically elected president who welcomed the intervention of the armed forces in 1973, Juan Maria Bordaberry (1972-1976). He was followed by another civilian, Aparicio Mendez (1976-1981) who was appointed by the military, and finally, by a general, Gregorio Alvarez (1981-1985). In Brazil (1964-1985), the alliance between civilians and the military was the clearest. The military acted collectively, not allowing for any personal domination to be established. So, the military dictatorship in Brazil saw five leaders in the twenty one years of rule: Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967), Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969), Garrastazu Medici (1969-1974), Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979), and Joao Figueiredo (1979-85).

Hence, not all the dictatorships in the South were personal regimes (Chile and Paraguay), and we can also register collective forms of leaderships in the form of juntas (Uruguay, Argentina), or with limited personal autonomy (Brazil).

The communist regimes in Eastern Europe are also very different although ideologically found under the same approach of communist regimes, or more exactly of state socialism. All the regimes were established after the Second World War in the interval 1945-1948, but in different national contexts, with the help of a local communist movement, or in the absence of such a political organization. Thereafter, different local events structure the evolution of the communist regimes such as the 1956 revolution in Hungary, the 1968 revolt in Czechoslovakia, and the occupation by the Soviet army, as well as the reactions in other countries such as Romania, the dissent and protests followed by the 1980 martial law in Poland. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s the differences between these
regimes made the national scenarios sometimes closer to the situation found in the Southern Cone of South America.

The preeminence of specific leaders in these differentiated contexts is also unequal. Personal dictatorships are the regimes in Romania with Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-1989), and in Bulgaria with Todor Zhivkov (1954-1989), although in the latter case, the allegiance to Moscow is stable until the end.

After 1956, the Hungarian regime of “Goulash communism” saw with János Kádár (1956-1988) the choice to accommodate public aspirations for limited sovereignty, modest economic progress and in the context of political-ideological demobilization, made provisions for the citizens’ personal space under existing socialism. Kádár also agreed to come to terms, by way of cooptation and selective marginalization, with the traditionally recalcitrant intellectuals. The remaining critical intellectuals – none of whom were jailed for political reasons after 1973 – were free (censorship and mild police harassment permitting) to have their say and thus became tolerated nay-sayers in the public arena.  

Among the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Polish case is a unique one as it saw an increased autonomy of several actors in relation to the state. First of all, the Catholic Church remained autonomous, and the party, the Polish United Workers’ Party (PWUP) “played the role of a hegemonic party, rather than being the sole party organization in the country.” For Andrew Michita what characterized the different phases of Polish communism was dissent, different forms of popular resistance, which were consecrated in the final recognition by the state of the citizens’ right to independent political organization.

In Czechoslovakia the experience of communism was further complicated by the difference between the Czech lands and Slovakia. A federal state since the constitution of 1968 separated the governments of the two countries after 20 years of shared communist rule. Thus, in the 1970s they had different structures of power. An important need for reforms was registered in 1968, followed by the Soviet occupation and the so-called “normalization” campaign. The normalization included the decimation of the Writers’ Union, the dismantlement of certain humanistic studies, and the eviction of 900 University professors. Then came the moment of the Charter 77, which “was more of a network of
communication and artistic expression than a formal association for action. It also came to provide the basis for the expression of an alternative view of life, the ‘second polis’, suggesting the formation of modes of action separate from, but parallel to, those of the state.”

Intellectual life was also not as tightly controlled [in Slovakia] after 1968 as in the Czech lands. As a result, many Slovaks who had they lived in the Czech lands would have been classified as dissidents by the regime were able to keep their jobs in the official world while at the same time engaging in what Martin Bútora, one of the founders of Public Against Violence, has called “constructive deviance”. In the late 1980s, activist intellectuals were able to use officially approved organizations, such as the Guardians of Nature, to organize and engage in activities to support the environment and other non-conformist actions.

The Bulgarian regime of Todor Zhivkov (1954-1989) remained a close ally of Moscow, but in the same time accentuated, as Nicolae Ceauşescu the nationalistic project. As in the Romanian case, Zhivkov celebrated the very long history of his state, as the 1981 celebration of the 1300 years of the Bulgarian state proved. New monuments and buildings were imagined by the regime, which had at its center Zhivkov as father of the nation. Specific to the Bulgarian case is the family approach to culture with the daughter of the leader, Lyudmila Zhivkova, who was in charge of the State Committee for Culture since the 1970s, and until her death in 1981. Certain liberalism in culture was seen in the 1970s when Zhivkov wanted to attract intellectuals and artists to his cause, just as Ceauşescu did in the mid-1960s.

Romania experienced with Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-1989) an extreme political centralization, meaning he was the sole decision-maker. This exaggerated power the Romanian leader held has been analyzed in terms of Ceauşescuism (Trond Gilberg) or sultanism (Juan Linz). Ceauşescu played an important role in the articulation of artistic policies. At the beginning of his regime, he used artists so as to legitimize his rule, and then imposed his nationalist policy openly since 1971 (“the July theses”), which were reinforced in 1983 (“the Mangalia theses”) and maintained until 1989. The 1971 July Theses included a 17 points program with the lines that were to be followed by party activists in the purpose of “ameliorating the political-ideological and cultural-educational” level of all citizens. Artists were assigned specific tasks especially “through different forms...
and varied styles of expression, art must serve the people, the fatherland, the socialist society”.

The political mandatory orientation of all artistic and media products was also announced; as well as the support of national products, especially historical films and patriotic poetry, and the endorsement of two mass cultural festivals, Cântarea României (Romanian Song) and Cenaclul Flacăra (The Flame Cenacle).

**Art and Politics in Dictatorships: A Theoretical Framework**

Although dictatorships argue differently when they attempt to politicize every artistic gesture, it is only aesthetically that art is political, as several theoreticians have argued: Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jacques Rancière. Boris Groys underlines “the ability of art to resist external pressure” because of its autonomy, although in fact, Adorno was the one that first observed “the double character of art, in the same time autonomous and a social fact”, and this dual role of art supports our analysis here.

As Hannah Arendt acknowledged, art has always been important for the political, but it appears that during modern times, this relationship is most easily seen in nondemocratic regimes and most specifically in the case of totalitarian regimes that have been studied extensively. Aside the examples of the Nazi dictatorship, of the Soviet Union, and of the fascist dictatorship of Mussolini, there are other modern dictatorships that use art in their consolidation of power or at least impose a mandatory program to the arts. Beside the aestheticization of the political practiced by the fascists and the politicization of the arts that the communists imagined in response, as Walter Benjamin observed, there are additional regimes that used somehow different strategies. My study investigates these other examples, as everything is politicized under a dictatorship and artists are among the first to react to this reality, and to try to give form to broader feelings while the regimes seek to subdue artists exactly for their power.

There is a growing literature on art and politics stemming from very diverse disciplines, from cultural studies, or sociology, to philosophy, and art history. These studies include the francophone approach, either institutional following the sociological method of Pierre Bourdieu, or the eclectic analyses coordinated for example by Lachaud, or Van Essche. In the Anglo-Saxon space we can spot other types of approaches, linking democracy and artistic expressions. History of art also discusses political
art or revolutionary art that uses political references, political quotation, and direct interventions in the status quo so as to alter it, etc. These studies document several types of relations that appear between artistic forms and the political, but no coherent theorization that can be used in other studies, such as this one, is visible. Therefore, a mix of approaches and theoretical points of view guides the analysis of the Southern Cone countries and the Eastern European regimes.

If political science has not yet developed a particular approach for the study of arts, there are several authors and concepts that are useful to our understanding, as the focus on “art and politics/politics and the arts” progresses. While no full-fledged theory exists in this eclectic subfield, several approaches and foci can be identified in recent literature. An attempt to establish a specific method under the heading of “politics and the arts” has been developing especially since the 1980s in the United States, where attention was given to artistic practices in democracies as a new space for enriching political theory (the American Political Science Association has organized sections on literature and film, and since 1974 the Social Theory, Politics and the arts conferences have convened). Literary works were privileged by this focus such as “the narrative turn” shows, only to recently include visual arts practices. In Europe, the subfield has developed with the support of the Polarts standing group inside the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) since 1995. In the Polarts framework, as part of the art and politics fluid group, are those authors inspired by the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière or Roland Barthes etc., and who relate these ideas to visual arts, or literary illustrations.

These approaches deal essentially with democratic regimes in North America and Western Europe, and scarcely take into account the non-democratic experiences. This research tries to do just that, to integrate the type of analyses developed to study art in relation to the political through the investigation of modern dictatorships. This kind of focus can help enrich our understanding of the role art can, and does play in politics.

Although Marx did not develop an aesthetic theory, his writings on artistic topics have inspired most of the reflections on the relationship between art and politics inside what can be called the “Marxist constellation”. The connection between art and politics has been analyzed under different names and from different viewpoints such as the relation between society and art, the commitment of the artist, art for art versus committed art, etc. The common denominator of these studies
is found in the Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches – such as those of Georg Lukacs and the Frankfurt School scholars: Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse. Critical theory analyzes the importance of cultural industries and their effects, such as the individual alienation in advanced capitalism, but their conclusions are not useful for the communist experiences; erstwhile they can be applied to the South American cases, which saw a neo-liberal experiment. Post-Marxist influences are also quite common in art and politics’ studies: Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, but most importantly Jacques Rancière’s studies. Different art forms have also seen the development of even more specific approaches: film (Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Rancière, Walter Benjamin), photography (Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin, Susan Sontag); theater (J. Rancière), music (T. Adorno), literature (Pierre Bourdieu, J. Rancière), and visual arts (J. Rancière, Michel Foucault.). These different theorizations make even more difficult to pinpoint the general “art and politics” heading.

Art in Dictatorships of Eastern Europe: Totalitarian & Post-totalitarian Art

One of the most comprehensive analyses of totalitarian art is that by Igor Golomstock who follows the Arendtian perspective. Golomstock considers that artistic life in the period 1932-1937 in the Nazi dictatorship, and the Soviet one was “entirely determined by Hannah Arendt’s three main characteristics of totalitarianism: ideology, organization and terror”. This same framework of analysis is useful for the understanding of other dictatorships because they impose an official vision of art (ideology), and convey an institutionalization of this official art through institutions (organization), ensuring that no alternative projects can contest their monopoly (terror). Golomstock delineates five instances that are deployed by totalitarian regimes in the process of imposing totalitarian art:

1. The state declares art (and culture as a whole) to be an ideological weapon and a means of struggle of power; 2. the state acquires a monopoly over all manifestations of the country’s artistic life; 3. the state constructs an all-embracing apparatus for the control and direction of art; 4. from the multiplicity of artistic movements then in existence, the State selects one movement, always the most conservative, which most nearly answers its needs and declares it to be official and obligatory; 5. finally the State
declares war to death against all styles and movements other than the official ones, declaring them to be reactionary and hostile to class, race, people, Party or State, to humanity, to social or artistic progress etc.\textsuperscript{39}

Totalitarian regimes constructed an institutional framework that centralized every artistic gesture. Nonetheless, other forms of art continued to exist.

What’s specific to totalitarian regimes, in Golomstock’s opinion, is that they create a specific cultural expression, “totalitarian art with its own ideology, aesthetics, its own organization and style”.\textsuperscript{40} “Total realism” was the international style of totalitarian culture and could be seen in Nazi Germany, in the Soviet Union and its satellites, and in communist China.\textsuperscript{41}

The main principle of totalitarian ideology was the spirit of the party which meant that an artist had to look at reality through the eyes of the party... and to accomplish this task, the writer and the artist had to live the life of the people, had to play an active role in the building of the new society and depict, in a simple language and generally comprehensible, the works and accomplishments of the masses under the guiding of their leaders, struggling to create history.\textsuperscript{42}

Socialist Realism that became the unique and mandatory official style in the Soviet Union after 1932, and in the satellite communist countries after 1945 demanded that artworks were “‘realistic’ in form, and socialist in content”.\textsuperscript{43} From the writers, this unique style was extended to all the arts. Without any conceptual rigor, Socialist Realism “reflected a surreal reality, reconstructed ideally from political directives” and the artists had to abide by these and “to tell the truth. The truth was what the Party said”.\textsuperscript{44} Aucouturier recalls, “the aesthetic content was secondary, the essence of Socialist Realism did not reside in its directives, but in its orthodoxy statute that placed art under the jurisdiction of the totalitarian party-State”.\textsuperscript{45}

One of the main characteristics of the totalitarian unions was they were mandatory, if an artist wanted to continue to create, he had to join the official union which was based on the new dogma.\textsuperscript{46} An important aspect of totalitarian art in its Eastern version is the organization by the state of the different artistic fields and the establishment of what Miklos Haraszti called the “state artist”. The Hungarian intellectual describes, in his famous volume \textit{The velvet prison: Artists under state socialism}, the situation of his country’s artists, but which is also applicable to other
communist countries, where artists were transformed in state workers as in any other field. “These artists are educated to be unable to create anything unpublishable. They are trained to be creative executors.” In fact, as Overy observed, “there existed very little cultural resistance in either state [the Nazi and the Stalinist regimes] to the stifling of artistic experiment and openness” and “one of the chief reasons for this success lies not in the apparatus of cultural repression, but in the extent to which the great majority of those engaged in all the many forms of cultural expression participated, willingly or otherwise, in sustaining the new artistic reality.”

In the same time, totalitarian regimes developed into post-totalitarianism and the characteristics of art and artists were also transformed. In Eastern Europe this was seen after the 1956 thaw, and with different national trajectories. The analyses of totalitarian art of Haraszti and Golomstock do not include the different artistic expressions created during the dictatorship that did not respect the official line, as this investigation will. Groys’ conclusion for the Soviet Union is also useful for other East European cases, “The majority of unofficial artists, writers, poets, and intellectuals believed that the true protest against the oppressive power of the Soviet system consisted not in criticizing it, but in ignoring it”. In fact, “a new value system had established itself. The art community valued not the artworks that defined the core message and the specific aesthetics of Socialist Realism, but rather the artworks that were able to widen the borders of censorship, to break new ground, to give other artists more operative space”. But, as Piotrowski observed, this situation of two cultural scenes, functioning in parallel was not common to all the countries in the East: “One of the key historic problems of Czechoslovak culture of the 1970s was its duality. The phenomenon of the ‘parallelism’ of official and unofficial culture was much less apparent in the other countries of the region and in some, for instance Poland, it was entirely absent”. Furthermore, an essential observation of Groys concerning Soviet artists, also applies to the Romanian context of the Ceaușescu period. Groys answers the question “Why [Soviet] artists did not practice something like an institutional critique directed against power structures...why they were not politically engaged...?” by saying that opposing the state would have meant opposing the Union of Soviet Artists that was a bureaucratic organization that dominated the artistic space governed by other artists.

Meanwhile, artists created art that disrupted the official codes of creation and of conduct, thus unsettling the official myth of totalitarian art. As Piotrowski notes, in some East-Central European countries, artists had
to freedom to create as long as they did not touch upon politics. During its post-totalitarian phase,

\(\ldots\) the [Polish] regime allowed a certain amount of freedom of artistic expression, but only within the sphere of formal experimentation. \(\ldots\) To use M. Haraszti’s term, the artist lived in a “velvet prison” and he knew the price of that velvet lining. As the regime enlarged the cage, giving the artist greater freedom of expression, his desire to break out faded. \(\ldots\) In return the regime demanded from him neutrality, lack of criticism and respect for ritual linguistic conventions, as well as active production, formal experimentation and the use of Modernist or rather postmodernist stylistic approaches that could attest to the “modernity” and “Occidentalism” of the post-totalitarian society \(\ldots\) The regime...required modern but uncritical art that did not question the status quo and respected the post-totalitarian social order, an order that was both totalitarian and consumerist, or more precisely, post-totalitarian and pre-consumerist.\(^{53}\)

This situation recalls the Chilean experience of the dictatorship, as well as other authoritarian examples from the Southern Cone of South America.

The different communist regimes in Eastern Europe allowed for diverse degrees of freedom and at different times, further complicating the regional panorama. “There were times when liberalization in one country occurred simultaneously with the tightening of political controls in another. This meant that, depending on the location and political context, the same type of art could have radically different meaning and significance in different countries of the region”.\(^{54}\) As we recalled it above, citing the Polish example, all the regimes disavowed any open critique of the regime and any political engagement.\(^{55}\) The limits of autonomy, and of liberalization after the thaw were very different, making Romania an exception, closest to the Bulgarian experience.

Another well-documented example of totalitarian art is that of the Nazi experience. For Lionel Richard, “Nazism was the best example of a culture that was both the instrument and the expression of political power”.\(^{56}\) The guiding principles of the Nazi experiment were those expressed by Hitler himself. Nazi culture was imagined as an expression of race that the new man personified (the accent was placed on the Arian body, healthy, and robust that exulted biological values as presented by ancient Greek art), and was based on moral values (patriotism, heroism, obeying, love of work, the leader, and war).\(^{57}\) Like in the Soviet Union, for the National Socialist government, “the role of the artist was essential:
he served through his work the national community. Art became then a propaganda tool that fell under the arbitrary of political power”. If in the USSR, writers were “engineers of the soul”, in Nazi Germany they were meant to be “cultural soldiers of Adolf Hitler”. Again, as in the Soviet Union and following the precepts of the vanguards, “the German society was meant to become, in the eyes of the Nazi officials, a work of art: art was not supposed to represent life, but life had to become a work of art” and its architect was Hitler.

In the same time, Glenn Cuomo underlines “the competing ideological, economic, and personal agendas pursued by the leading members of the Nazi hierarchy and the network of state, police, and Nazi Party agencies, ministries and departments” and their “overlapping purviews and rivaling interests (…) aptly labeled state of authoritarian anarchy”. In fact, “the cultural policy put in practice by the National Socialist regime encompassed many principles that seemed to be incompatible. On the one hand, Hitler and the Party leadership promoted an aesthetic of representational art rooted in the realism and neoclassicism of the previous century. On the other hand, they also were willing to embrace the most recent technological advances in the new mass media of broadcasting and film.” A detail in this sense is worth remembering, “The German [film] industry was second only to Hollywood in 1933...ticket sales expanded more than fourfold between 1933 and 1944.” Despite of this total project, the Nazi regime failed to control all the mechanisms of escape and resistance as a recent volume by Vincent Platini shows. Platini has investigated the ways in which several mass produced cultural products were able to construct a daily resistance to the total project of the regime; through crime novels, *Krimi* the author shows the many ways in which entertainment was both used by the regime, but failed to submit to its totalitarian policies. A sum of contradictions was found underneath the surface of the Nazi project, as any other totalitarian example shows. Likewise, in the Soviet Union, after the second world war, in 1948 some fifty “trophy films” (American, English, Italian, French) taken from the liberated countries were shown in cinemas and met with the public’s enthusiasm, so they were soon taken out of the movie theaters.

This investigation reveals how the concept of totalitarian art is not useful to define the entire period of the communist regimes, as some of them develop into post-totalitarianism. Furthermore, not all the art produced during these regimes respected the official canon. And finally, national evolutions were more important in different turning points.
Art in Dictatorships of the Southern Cone: Authoritarian Art? An Institutional Perspective

There is no equivalent study of art of authoritarian regimes that would include cases in Southern Europe (Italy under Benito Mussolini, Spain under Francisco Franco, and Portugal under Antonio Salazar), and South America, and in fact this project tries to fill this gap in the scholarship by providing an analysis of diverse cases of modern dictatorships.

In the same time, we could identify a sum of elements that are specific to what could be called “authoritarian art” as it develops in Southern Europe. In Fascist Italy, “Cultural policy was [rather] executed through the encouraging of supporters, than by destroying those that were against”. This consideration is very well suited for authoritarian regimes and their approach of the arts. They rather support those artistic expressions that are congruent with the official ideology, than impose a unique style. The regime of Antonio Salazar (1932-1968) in Portugal, and that of Francisco Franco (1939-1975) in Spain developed long-lasting systems that saw an evolution in the cultural field. In what concerns their approach of culture, the basic principles followed by the two regimes encompassed: an accent laid on tradition, the Catholic faith, the nation, the homeland, a cult of the leader (in Spain); the promotion of a standardized form of folklore (with such extreme examples as the “most Portuguese village” competition of 1938), the defense and use of the patrimony, especially of the imperial one, propaganda.

Culture during the Franco regime was declared apolitical, but in the first decades concentrated on the winners of the Civil War (1936-1939) translating in a predominant memorial culture with reminders of the fallen, and statues dedicated to Francisco Franco; as well as on the Catholic heritage. In the last decades, accompanying the economic development, a culture of “escape/evasion” centered on the corridas, easy-going comedies and literature, coupled with radio shows became dominating. High-culture, artistic innovation were abandoned by the state and granted to the market, thus suffering in an important manner. This model is close to the Chilean experience during the Pinochet regime. In the same time, the two authoritarian regimes did not develop a centralized institutional framework for the artistic domain, but used several institutions and privileged institutional dispersal. In the Portuguese case we see how it is a private foundation that assumed the role of the ministry of culture, supporting what the state did not: the Gulbenkian Foundation. Established
in 1956, the foundation had an art collection, libraries, and scientific magazines, an orchestra, and a dance company; today it administers one of the few important art museums in Lisbon.

The Chilean dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1989) has been considered mainly as a form of “apagón cultural” or cultural blackout, and the main opposition to it, formed by left wing movements and personalities connected to the government of Salvador Allende (1970-3) was exiled, if it did not suffer the policies of extermination enforced by the regime. The core of this opposition was culturally inspired by socialism and used confrontation, and an open critique of the military regime. While this type of reaction is interesting, my analysis will make use of the investigation of those artistic expressions that came about and offered an alternative, for example in the form of the neo-vanguard expressions (such as C.A.D.A. or Colectivo Acciones de Arte, 1979-1985) as theorized by the cultural critic Nelly Richard under the label of “Escena de Avanzada” (New vanguard scene). The absence of an unitary, ideological, political project of the military after the coup d’état led the junta to resort to the different Right wing groups supporting this intervention. The approach of the Pinochet regime was not unitary, clearly framed and linear but an approach subjected to different centers of influence. The strategy of the regime encompassed at least three axes: the nationalistic-authoritarian, the integrist high culture conception, traditionalist, Catholic, and the neoliberal one which imposed the market model. The latter split into two paradoxical directions: elitist manifestations (opera and ballet, classical music and theater, academic painting, “bourgeois folklore”), and mass-culture (cultural industries and particularly the audiovisual).

The Chilean cultural model was based on private initiative, on private patronage, but also on direct and active state support specifically undertaken by the Departamento de Extensión Cultural (Department of Cultural Diffusion) of the Ministry of Education starting with 1977. Furthermore, the Secretaría de Relaciones Culturales attached to the General Secretariat of the Government since 1974 had the role of promotion of the official programs, together with the private entities. The different tendencies that structured the official approach had in common the affirmation of the apolitical character of art: art must only develop its specific language and must not be tainted by the political. The mass culture direction saw the recuperation by the regime of “the most commercial popular music, especially the romantic ballad and the ‘rock-mantic ballad’”.66 Televised culture was encouraged by the Pinochet
regime by direct economic stimulus, such that 95% of Chilean houses had a television set by 1983,\textsuperscript{67} while reading was discouraged by directly punishing the book industry.\textsuperscript{68} “The permanent party on the screen [was] the consolation for an anemic nocturnal life” because if “streets were sad, screens were over-cheerful and wore spangles”.\textsuperscript{69}

The discussion of the “apagón cultural” or cultural blackout was seen not only in Chile, but also in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In the four countries, the artists considered the regimes did not have a cultural project, but in fact, those artists that did not follow the ideological line of the regimes were punished, and in exchange an apolitical, safe version of culture and art were promoted. The four used television as a privileged means of transmission of their cultural program, and of the propaganda. The five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) used folklore in their cultural projects, as a strategy of legitimation.

Other coincidences occur, such as 1975 being the year of cultural policy in three of the five countries: Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. This year is also the one in which Operation Condor was institutionalized through the secret meeting of the heads of the secret polices in Santiago. In Brazil, the official cultural model was gradually consecrated by the military regime. In 1975, they announced the “National cultural policy”. In 1968 the cultural space was already controlled by the infamous Institutional Act No 5 (December 1968), which established “preventive censorship”.\textsuperscript{70} In fact, the Brazilian regime began to be interested in culture when the “economical miracle” (1967-73) proved to be a failure and in the same time that the regime tried to liberalize (\textit{distensão}) during the administration of Ernesto Geisel, since 1974.\textsuperscript{71} The Brazilian project of cultural reform included the establishment of new institutions and the reform of previous ones. The state was not central to this project, and there was, as in Argentina and Chile a plurality of institutions, and in the Brazilian and Argentinian case the federal character of the state further multiplies them. In 1966 the Brazilian state established the Federal Council of Culture (modifying the National Council of Culture established in 1938); in the same time, another center of state power was the Department of Cultural Affairs (DAC)\textsuperscript{72} inside the Ministry of Education and Culture created in 1970.\textsuperscript{73} Besides these 2 institutions, there were also the University networks, the federal units (state, federal district and municipalities), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also department and sub-departments in other ministries and the Secretary of Planning of the Presidency.\textsuperscript{74} Under the presidency of Geisel new institutions were created such as the very important Funarte
(National Foundation of Art), but also other institutional reforms. Without an apparent link, it is also in 1975 that the Pinochet regime imagined its main cultural project, *The Cultural Policy of the Government of Chile*. The project the Pinochet regime imagined towards its end, in 1988, *Project of a plan of cultural national development* included similar institutions to the ones promoted by the Brazilian dictatorship, the Fondart (similar to Funarte), as well as the specific institutes dedicated to music or literature in Chile.

In Argentina there was no ministry of culture once the last dictatorship took over in 1976 as in the other countries. Since 1964, the Under-secretary of culture had replaced the General Direction of culture created in 1958 as an institution dependent on the Ministry of Education and Culture. In 1981 the sub-secretary was transformed in a Cultural Secretary dependent on the presidency and had 3 under-secretaries, of cultural policy and programs, of cultural relations and cultural action. There were contradictions of the cultural policies in the Argentine dictatorship and not many funds dedicated to it, except for the 500% increase of funds by Jorge Videla for the World Football Cup of 1978, which Argentina won, in order to promote a better image of the military abroad. The sub-secretary of Culture Francisco Carcavallo (1976-1981) was succeeded by four other ministers, and three under-secretaries of culture. Carcavallo created a Plan of Technical Assistance in 1976 that offered classes of theater, dance, plastic arts, dance, music, folklore, literature, etc. to the municipalities of the provinces so as to form their own centers of plastic arts, literatures, orchestras, etc. This initiative could not be continued due to the lack of funds in the provinces. Carcavallo also sought to transfer the “classical and traditional culture” through theater works and itinerant exhibitions but these were also problematic due to the lack of funds and the lack of artworks in museums. The climate of the 1960s and 1970s linked any artistic or cultural activity to “subversion” and to deal with this, the military imagined “Operativo Claridad” (Operation Clarity), a program meant to eliminate subversion in the educational and cultural spheres. This included the “normalization” of libraries and public school, certain artistic education programs were closed temporarily or permanently, and censorship was in place between 1977 and 1981.

The military dictatorship in Uruguay did not organize a central institution specifically dealing with culture. As in the other Southern Cone countries, there was a Ministry of Education and Culture, the SODRE (Servicio Oficial de Difusion Radio Electrica), the cultural sections of
Intendencias and the education system. In 1975, the military also created DINARP (National Directorate for Public Relations) that played a role as censor and promoter of different cultural activities of the regime such that of supervising the publishing of books, posters, discs, films, etc.\textsuperscript{79} Despite the lack of a centralized institutional framework, the culture of “the new Uruguay” was promoted by the military dictatorship (1975-80) through such programs as “1975 – Año de la Orientalidad, 150 anos de la nación” (1975 The year of orientalism – 150 years of nationhood) accompanied by a sculptural and monumental euphoria connected to the image of José Gervasio Artigas, the hero of independence. In fact, as in the Chilean case, inside the regime there were several ideological currents that were promoting cultural projects: the conservative traditional thought, ultra-right Catholicism, nationalist revisionism of the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the nativist currents in art, military historiography and political ruralism.\textsuperscript{80} Interestingly enough, the cinemateca (film library) was and still is very influent in Uruguay, and even films that denounced the socialist regimes were transformed in instruments of critique of the Uruguayan dictatorship.

Finally, in Paraguay, there is also a spreading of tasks and a lack of centralization. The institutions that dealt with cultural activities during the Stroessner regime included the “Department of Superior Education and Cultural Diffusion” (1940), and the “General Direction of Cultural Goods” (1983) in the Ministry of Education. Along with this, involved in the promotion of culture, there was the Cultural Direction of the Municipality of Asuncion; for censorship, there was the “Commission of Morality and Public Shows”.\textsuperscript{81} As Ticio Escobar observes the fact that the long dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989), one of the longest in Latin America did not develop a positive policy for the cultural field, does not mean it did not have one. “Even if negative, a system needs ideological support” and this was based on “the control, censorship, fear and punishment, and the complete lack of funding”.\textsuperscript{82} For Escobar the cultural model of the stronato used three myths, “the idea of History as the evolution of an epic and linear time that concluded with Stroessner, the concept of nation as the homogeneous content of an omnipotent state, and the notion of the people as an idealized subject”.\textsuperscript{83}
Concluding Remarks

No final conclusions can be put forward by this short theoretical preview of the analysis of the relationship between art and politics in modern dictatorships in Eastern Europe and South America that has introduced several theoretical landmarks. In the first part, the utility of the concept of modern dictatorship was addressed as it offers a common heading to the two types of regimes found in the two regions, and that political science analyses scrutinize separately. The analysis of the relationship between art and politics is addressed in an interdisciplinary approach that combines resources from contemporary philosophy with art theory, and art history, sociology of art and the analysis of cultural policies. The analyses of cultural manifestations, and specifically of the arts during the communist regimes in Europe use the term of totalitarian art as a lens of scrutiny. Erstwhile, this approach is not useful to understand the period addressed in this study – the 1970s and the 1980s – when post-totalitarianism developed distinctively in each country, making national events perhaps more important than the ideological common approach. Finally, the issue of a specific art of authoritarian regimes was addressed through an implicit comparison with the Southern European dictatorships of Mussolini, Franco and Salazar. By recalling the cultural institutional frameworks of the Southern Cone dictatorships we have already acknowledged the regimes’ intentions of establishing a cultural policy, but with only partial success in Brazil.
NOTES

1 This article is a part of the introduction to my book on the topic. Although in the proposal submitted to the New Europe College of Bucharest in 2014, I was planning to include several interviews with Romanian contemporary artists, I preferred to first write the theoretical introduction to the study. Thus, the subtitle given to this study, “A preview of theoretical problems”.

2 My study leaves aside: Albania (Enver Hoxha, 1944-85), Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito 1944-80), East Germany, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, which also had dictatorial regimes in the period analyzed. Equally so, I don’t discuss the Soviet Union cultural sphere, although several references are made throughout the study to this case.

3 The study will refer to the regimes of Todor Zhivkov (1954-89), and Petar Mladenov (1989-90).

4 The analysis will focus on the regime of Janos Kadar (1956-88).

5 The analysis will focus on the regimes of Edward Gierek (1970-80), Stanislaw Kania (1980-1), and Wojciech Jaruzelski (1981-9).

6 The study will focus on the regime of Gustav Husak (1975-89).


9 Iris Dressler, Hans D. Christ (eds.), Subversive Practices. Art under conditions of political repression 60s-80s/South America/Europe (Stuttgart: Hatje Cantz, 2010), 51.

10 They also have specific types of adulation, such as the “Purahei Kele’e” or adulating songs of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989).

11 While Linz warns about the misuse of “dictatorship” in his Introduction of Régimes totalitaires et autoritaires he also uses the formula “modern dictatorship” as a “general term” reuniting authoritarian regimes Linz, Juan, Régimes totalitaires et autoritaires (Paris: Armand Colin, 2006), 32-35.


15 Ibid., 480, 483.


He was followed by two other military leaders, Roberto Levingston (1970-1971), and Alejandro Lanusse (1971-1973).


Ibid., 74-75.


For a detailed analysis of many perspectives on the Zhivkov regime see: “Chapter 4 September Ninth, ‘People’s Democracy’ and Socialism” in Roumen Daskalov, Debating the Past Modern Bulgarian History: From Stambolov to Zhivkov (Budapest: CEU Press, 2011), 223-318.


Further on, in the same book, Groys specifies how he sees this autonomy “Art is of course political. All attempts to define art as autonomous and to situate it above or beyond the political field are utterly naïve.” Boris Groys, Art Power (MIT Press: Cambridge MA, London, England, 2008), 13, 163.


“La culture indique que l’art et la politique, nonobstant leurs conflits et leurs fusions, sont liés, et même en mutuelle dependence”. Hannah Arendt, La crise de la culture (Paris: Gallimard, 2011), 279.


Examples include the works of Davide Panagia who studies sensation and its roles in the study of politics, Michael Shapiro whose interests range from International Relations to cinematography and politics, the new cities and the political, Kia Lindroos interested in visuality, cinematic narrative, and Dana Arieli Horowitz writing about Israeli and Palestinian art, mainly photography, etc.


Igor Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the People’s Republic of China* (London: Collins Harvill, 1990), 82.


*Ibid.*, xv


CATERINA PREDA

44 Lachaud (2012), 57-58.
46 Igor Golomstock, Totalitarian Art..., 95.
49 Boris Groys, History becomes form..., 33.
54 Ibid., 9, 10.
55 Ibid., 106.
57 Ibid., 64, 123, 133, 69.
58 Ibid., 71.
59 Ibid., 77.
61 Ibid.
65 Igor Golomstock, 120.

Oscar Contardo and García Macarena, *La era ochentera. Tevé, pop y under en el Chile de los ochenta* (Santiago: Ediciones B, 2005), 12, 15.


**Ibid.**, 60.

Replaced at the end of the 1970s by the Secretary of Cultural Affairs that also changed in to the Secretary of Culture.


The General direction of Culture replaced the National Fund of Arts created the same year and which, at its turn, replaced the first cultural institution, the National Commission of Culture created in 1933. Octavio Getino, *Las industrias culturales en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Colihue, 1995), 339, 341.

**Ibid.**, 341.


The Direction of artistic education (1958) of Buenos Aires included 11 educational services among which, a school of plastic arts and 4 conservatories of music and scenic arts, etc., and Jorge Anaya led it.


**Ibid.**


**Ibid.**