Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense

Proceedings of the International Workshop, organized at the New Europe College, Bucharest on 21-22 October, 2011

Edited by Áron Telegdi-Csetri and Viorela Ducu
THE ATHEISTIC METAPHYSICS OF MODERN COSMOPOLITANISM

James ALEXANDER*

Modern cosmopolitanism is based on an error. It is an error concealed by a hope: the error is to think that there is a cosmopolitan world which can be theorised as one, and the hope is to suppose that there is such a world or could be such a world. The error is fundamental, that is philosophical: but it only comes to attention when we turn to the history of thought, because it is only in considering older forms of cosmopolitanism that we see where the error of modern cosmopolitanism lies.

The error is not the supposition that there is one world. There is no problem with this supposition. The problem is that modern cosmopolitanism supposes both that the world is two, or that there are two worlds, and that one of these two worlds is the only world, and therefore is both. This is a formal error. But it is an error which is concealed in much cosmopolitan writing because most cosmopolitan theorists present it as a difficulty which can be overcome rather than an impossibility which cannot be overcome.

In his recent *Visions of World Community* Jens Bartelson is only the latest of many to draw attention to the ‘paradox’ in cosmopolitanism. This paradox is that every effort to impose a given set of values on the existing plurality of communities in the name of a common humanity is likely to be met with resistance on the grounds of its own very particularity.¹

Almost all cosmopolitan theorists admit some variant of this paradox. The simple way of putting it is that we are torn between the universal and the particular; and a more subtle way of putting it is to say that any particular universal is itself particular and therefore not inclusive but exclusive. It is this exclusivity which seems to be the particular problem of modern cosmopolitanism. For *either* we have a world order which is inclusive, in the sense of accepting all particularity, because it lacks any sort of criterion which would exclude anyone; *or* we have a world order which is universal, but exclusive, because it has a criterion for inclusion which always makes it possible that some people would be excluded. Most modern cosmopolitan theories are supposed to reconcile the universal and the particular. But no theory offered so far has been convincing in showing how reconciliation could occur. Here I intend to indicate why conviction will always be lacking, and why reconciliation is impossible.

Bartelson resembles most modern cosmopolitans in following a recognition of this paradox with an attempt to overcome it.² His book is unusual because it takes the form of a history of cosmopolitan ideas. He rightly observes that most older forms of cosmopolitanism depended on some sort of ‘cosmological belief’. But since by his own account most cosmopolitan theorists after the eighteenth century attempted to ground cosmopolitanism on some sort of anthropological fact—
such as ‘sociability’—rather than some sort of metaphysical belief, it is rather odd that his book ends with the suggestion that we should reformulate “our conceptions of community in the light of our cosmological beliefs about the human habitat”. He wholly avoids asking the question of whether we have such beliefs. His history indicates that we almost certainly do not. And he fails to see that the older cosmological criterion for inclusion in a higher city divided humanity into two cities, where any modern anthropological criterion of inclusion is supposed to recognise that humanity forms one city.

It is necessary to look again at the history of cosmopolitan theory in order to indicate the nature of the non sequitur in Bartelson’s historical argument. And, in so doing, I shall sketch a history of cosmopolitanism which, like Beck’s, has three significant stages, but differs from Beck’s in suggesting that the three stages are, as Bartelson suggests, conditioned by metaphysical beliefs or by a lack of them: and, in particular, by our beliefs about God.

Almost every modern cosmopolitan theorist knows something about older cosmopolitan theories, although they rarely consider anyone other than Kant and the Stoics. Kant is a highly ambivalent figure, as I will later show. But the Stoics are fairly simple. Bartelson quotes the most famous utterance of Seneca from Schofield’s translation: “Let us embrace with our minds, two commonwealths: one great and truly common… the other one to which the particular circumstances of birth have assigned us… which pertains not to all men but a particular group of them.” Although, as Bartelson says, many modern theorists have engaged with the Stoics, they have not seemed to recognise what is going on in Stoic thought. The first thing to notice here is that there are two commonwealths mentioned, not one. The second is that Bartelson has not quoted the
utterance in full. In full, as Schofield has it, it reads that are two commonwealths,

one great and truly common—in which gods and men are contained, in which look not to this or that corner, but measure the bounds of our state \textit{civitas} with the sun; the other, the one to which the particular circumstances of birth have assigned us—this will be the commonwealth of the Athenians or the Carthaginians or some other city \textit{urbs}.\footnote{What Bartelson has left out is that the first city contains men and gods. This may not seem important. But it is fundamental to the structure of older cosmopolitan theories. For not only did all older cosmopolitans distinguish a higher and a lower city: they did so as a consequence of some sort of ‘cosmological belief’ about God or the gods.

If we understand the history of cosmopolitanism in terms of what was thought about God, we see that there were three great eras of cosmopolitan theory: which were successively dependent on a polytheistic, a monotheistic and an atheistic metaphysics. And I will argue that we cannot fully understand the paradox of modern cosmopolitanism until we see very clearly that its metaphysics are atheistic.

\textbf{I. Polytheistic Cosmopolitanism}

In all classical cosmopolitan theories there is a distinction between a higher world, or city, and a lower world, or city, or world of cities, and this is because the higher city is a city in which man lives with the gods—that is, in relation to law, which is the law of the world (as opposed to the law of any mere city), and in relation to reason, and in relation to nature. Since not all men have reason, not all men belong to the higher city. This was never a city which could exist through force.
The first historical use of the word *kosmopolités*, ‘citizen of the world’, is in Philo’s commentary on Moses’s law in the first century A.D.

It consists of an account of the creation of the world, implying that the world is in harmony with the Law, and the Law with the world, and that the man who observes the Law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world [kosmopolitou], regulating his doings by the purpose and will of Nature, in accordance with which the entire world itself also is administered.\(^8\)

But it is likely that Diogenes the Cynic was first to use the word.\(^9\) When asked which city he was from, Diogenes famously replied, ‘*Kosmopolités*: “I am a citizen of the world”. Scholars still disagree on what he meant by this: whether his ideal was a ‘positive’ one of an alternative order to the established political order or a ‘negative’ one of a rejection of any sort of political order. Perhaps Diogenes only meant by *kosmopolités* that he was “a homeless exile, to his country dread, a wanderer who begs his daily bread”—*apolis*, without a city, *aoikos*, without a home.\(^10\) But it is clear that he divided cities into two. Other men lived in the *polis*, but Diogenes’s *polis* was the *kosmos*. He is said to have used a famous argument:

> All things belong to the gods. The gods are friends to the wise, and friends share all property in common; therefore all things are the property of the wise. [...] The only true commonwealth [*politeia*] was, he said, that which is as wide as the universe [*kosmos*].\(^11\)

This argument was quite possibly influenced by later Stoic philosophy—since no one definitively knows how much old Cynic argument has been overlaid by Stoicism or how much
old Stoic argument is in fact Cynic. But it is the same argument that is found in Seneca. There are two worlds or cities. In one (the lower and yet plural world of cities) every man is included, and in the other (the higher and unitary world of one city) not every man is included: man forms a community with the gods. The same argument is used by Cicero:

Since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and god, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share the Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth [civitas].

Romans, like Cicero, sometimes identified this civitas with Rome, but, as Marcus Aurelius more properly understood, this higher city was neither to be identified with Rome nor with all humanity. Schofield explains:

The ideal city of Zeno’s Republic is indeed in a sense a universal community, whose citizens are (as Diogenes the Cynic claimed of himself) kosmopolitai. However, it is universal not in that it includes all mankind, but because it is made up of gods and sages wherever they may be: not a wider community, but a wholly different sort of ‘community’. When Chrysippus uses words like ‘city’ and ‘law’ he intends a radical transformation of their meaning, robbing them of anything ordinarily recognisable as political content. In other words, political vocabulary is depoliticised.

That is one way of putting it. Another way of putting it is to say that in classical cosmopolitanism the universe was politicised. But whichever way one puts it, one sees a division of two cities,
two polities, two worlds. The higher city which resulted was exclusive: not everyone was a citizen, only the gods and men who were like gods—because they were wise and good. As Plutarch said, this divided the world into two: cosmopolitans were told to look on good men as their kinsmen and the bad as foreigners.¹⁵

So, in short, in ancient cosmopolitanism there were two worlds, or two cities: a first, unitary, in which some men and the gods were together, and the second, a plurality, in which all men lived. No one ever said that all men composed one city.¹⁶

II. Monotheistic Cosmopolitanism

Christianity is almost always ignored by modern theorists of cosmopolitanism, since they ignore everything between Seneca and Kant.¹⁷ The reason for this is perhaps that Christian writers used ‘kingdom’, ‘city’ and ‘church’—and never used cosmopolitan language itself. Or perhaps because the emphasis on God does not appeal to a secular sensibility. And yet Christians sketched a vision of the world which bore marked similarities to the Cynic or Stoic vision.

The religious language of the Bible was highly political. The idea of a ‘kingdom of God’ separate from other kingdoms is evident in some Old Testament writings, e.g. in Daniel: “In the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever.” (Dan. 2.44.) In Christianity this idea was made universal—so that this city was now seen as higher than any ordinary city. The Jews had always considered Jerusalem the ‘holy city’, but in the New Testament it was exalted so it became anó ierousalém, ‘Jerusalem above’ (Gal. 4.25), or, in the Apocalypse, famously,
the ‘New Jerusalem’ of the vision tén polin tén hagian polin lerousalém kainén eidon, “I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem…” (Rev. 21.2) It was clear this was a higher city, as it came out of heaven, ‘as a bride adorned for her husband’.

Jesus ignored the division of men into different earthly cities. His commandments were universal: simply that “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength” and that “thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”. (Mark, 12.29-31.) The most important political saying of Jesus was “Render... unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22: 21), where he divided the world into two, one of Caesar and one of God. And when Pilate asked him whether he was the King of the Jews, he said, “My kingdom is not of this world [kosmos].” (John 18.36.) There was an ambiguity about whether this kingdom was something to come, or something which already existed. On the one hand: “The kingdom of God is within you”. (Luke 17.21) Yet on the other: “For here have we no continuing city, but we seek one to come.” (Heb. 13.14) But what was important was that it was only through Christ that one could become part of this higher city.

There were two major differences between this cosmopolitanism, if we may call it that, and the older Stoic one. One was that there were not many gods, but one God, so that it was through one’s relation to the one God (and not through law, reason, nature etc) that one entered the higher city. As Paul wrote, “There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” (Gal. 3:28) And the second was that faith replaced wisdom as the criterion of inclusion. “Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God’s good pleasure through the foolishness of
the preaching to save them that believe. Seeing that Jews ask for signs, and Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto Gentiles foolishness;... God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame the wise.” (1 Cor. 1:20-27.) As a criterion of inclusion, faith was clearly broader than wisdom—but, of course, never wholly inclusive, for it excluded those who did not have faith, just as wisdom excluded those who did not have it.

This doctrine of two cities, a higher one in which man is related to God, and a lower one in which man is related only to other men, and the related doctrine that one belongs to the higher city not through reason—which the Stoics thought man shares with the gods—but through faith, hope and charity—which the Christians thought man owed to God—was given clear development by Augustine. “Two cities, then, have been created by two loves,” he wrote. There was a higher love, the love of God (and therefore the love of the neighbour), and the love of self (and therefore what Kierkegaard was to call all ‘preferential’ love). The higher love was commanded of us even though it was impossible for us. Ought did not, in this case, imply could. Hence Christ’s crucifixion: which was God’s concession to us. But all this theology apart, it should be clear that in Christianity, there were two worlds, or two cities: a first in which some men and the one God were together (the ‘kingdom of God’ or ‘New Jerusalem’ which was, on earth, anticipated by ekklesia, the ‘church’ or ‘community’), and the second in which all men lived. And, again, the higher could not be established by force.

III. Atheistic Cosmopolitanism

So in polytheistic cosmopolitanism there was a higher city in which some men and the gods had reason in common,
and in monotheistic cosmopolitanism there was a higher city
in which some men had faith in God. Both distinguished
the higher city, which was exclusive, from the lower city, or
cities, which were inclusive. But they did so in terms of man’s
relation to the gods (through reason) or God (through faith).
Modern cosmopolitanism is atheistic, anthropological rather
than theological, and so, lacking gods or God, has no way of
distinguishing the higher city, not of this world, from the lower
city of this world. The two cities are, as a consequence the
same: and yet they are not. This is the real ‘paradox’ of modern
cosmopolitanism.

Accounts of modern cosmopolitanism often begin with
Kant. It is not said often enough that Kant is a highly ambivalent
figure. In Perpetual Peace, written in 1795, he certainly
distinguished Staatsrecht, political right, and Völkerrecht,
international right, from Weltbürgerlichrecht, cosmopolitan
right: which considered man from a ‘universally philanthropic’
point of view: where Menschen und Staaten, or individuals
and states, could be regarded as Bürger alles angemeinen
Menschenstaats, or citizens of a universal state of mankind.21
Most modern cosmopolitans admire this but lament that Kant
only took cosmopolitan right as far as ‘universal hospitality’—
rather than further into universal justice.22 But to see Kant as
the first modern cosmopolitan (in so far as he advocated a sort
of cosmopolitan order which could be established in the world
of man) is to ignore the fact that he can be seen as the last Stoic
or Christian cosmopolitan (in so far as he advocated a higher
city which existed only in relation to God). Just as Christians
spoke of the ‘Kingdom of God’, Kant famously spoke of the
‘Kingdom of Ends’.

This was part of his characterisation of the categorical
imperative. If we were to act according to the categorical
imperative, Kant argued, this would be to belong (depending on
how one translates *Reich der Zwecke*) to a ‘Realm’ or ‘Empire’ or ‘Kingdom’ of Ends—a ‘systematic union of different rational beings through common laws’.23 This could only exist if everyone followed the moral law. So far, so secular. But there is evidence that Kant thought the Kingdom of Ends could only exist in relation to God. “Woe to the legislator who would establish through force a polity directed to ethical ends! For in so doing he would not only bring about the very opposite of an ethical polity but [would] also undermine and make unstable his political polity.”24 Scholars still cannot agree on whether Kant’s Kingdom of Ends was metaphysical, in which case it was only a secularisation and minimisation of older Stoic or Christian ethical ideals, and of conscientious significance only, or whether it was political, in which case, as he saw, the unanswerable question of how it was to be established was raised.25

Modern cosmopolitans do not, like Kant, seek a criterion such as the categorical imperative by which inclusion in a higher city can be achieved. For they are atheistic, have abandoned any criterion of inclusion which would be an exclusive inclusivity, and seek to do something no cosmopolitan ever did before which is unify the higher city and the lower city. I have already mentioned Bartelson’s point that modern cosmopolitans abandoned reason—and faith—to attempt to establish the universal in terms of some inclusive ‘human’ quality such as sociability.26 But sociability in itself cannot explain why humans should be considered to live in a higher, united city, when their sociability is expressed perfectly well in lower, disunited cities. The entire problem is a consequence of the fact that modern cosmopolitans want *both* to claim that there is one city, *and* to claim that there are two.27 So they leave us eternally torn between a higher city which is exclusive, and a lower city which is inclusive—while claiming at times that these two cities are the same. This is not only paradoxical:
it is impossible. But modern cosmopolitan theorists call the impossibility a difficulty and claim that it can be ‘overcome’.

We see what forms this overcoming can take in two recent books both entitled *Cosmopolitanism*, one by a well-known liberal theorist and one by a well-known radical theorist. (A liberal, loosely, is someone whose theories emphasise the individual, take legal form, and derive policies from principles. A radical, loosely, is someone whose theories emphasise some sort of collective, take sociological form, and advocate some sort of practice—or *praxis*.)

Held, in his *Cosmopolitanism*, claims to recognise the paradox of modern cosmopolitanism, but seems also to suppose that by recognising it he has solved it. He distinguishes two worlds, a higher one of universal, abstract principles and a lower one of actual traditions. And he says that while his theory “aims at being universal, it tries to address cultural and political specificity seriously”. It does this in the form of a compromise which Held calls a ‘layered cosmopolitanism’—a ‘mix of regulative principles and interpretive activity’. In this way he can defend the imposition of the universal on the particular and yet at one and the same time deny the imposition of the universal on the particular. Somehow his imposed order of a set of ‘metaprinciples’, ‘principles’ and ‘policies’ is meant to have specificity built into its universality. But only at the cost of contradiction. Anyone who asserts that “the principles of cosmopolitanism are the conditions for taking cultural diversity seriously” cannot also assert without contradiction that “the meaning of cosmopolitan regulative principles cannot be elucidated independently of an ongoing discussion in public life”. But this is exactly what Held does.

Harvey, in his *Cosmopolitanism*, takes far more seriously than Held the question of ‘why seemingly noble universal projects and utopian plans so often fail’. He is critical of
Held and other ‘New Cosmopolitans’—Nussbaum, Beck, Appiah and others—who advocate an ‘ethereal and abstracted universalism’ while making concessions to particularity which are incompatible with it. He observes, for instance, that Held’s ‘caveat [about particularity] has immense implications’ for his universalism, since it means that every universal principle could be interpreted in ‘any which way’. Harvey sees that most cosmopolitan theorists want to overcome and yet cannot overcome the contradiction of the universal and the particular. He claims, probably rightly, that the particular is usually “opportunistically appealed to [by such theorists] in order to discredit unfavoured or promote favoured universal positions”. This is all exemplary. But when Harvey turns to his own suggestions we find, again, the same belief that the difficulty can in principle be overcome.

Whereas Held advocates a singular ‘layered cosmopolitanism’, Harvey advocates a more pluralistic vision of ‘subaltern cosmopolitanisms’. Unlike Held, he has no principles or policies to suggest: instead he says that “the task… is to work across different scales”. He tells us that the ‘cosmopolitan project’ needs “a dialectic, process-based, and interactive approach to world historical geography”—whatever that means. All we can take it to mean is that whereas Held sees the solution to the paradox of cosmopolitanism as lying in a static legal framework which lays down the conditions for particularity, Harvey sees it as lying in some sort of dynamic practice which is itself always particular. But this is even less of a solution than Held’s. If Held’s cosmopolitanism fails to overcome the contradiction between universality and particularity, at least it embodies it. Harvey’s cosmopolitanism overcomes the contradiction by ignoring it: by disposing of universality altogether, and recognising only particularity. But a cosmopolitanism which recognises only particularity is not cosmopolitanism at all.
Neither Held nor Harvey offers an even slightly convincing vision of world community. Held’s theory is a barrage of suggestions which cannot conceal a fundamental theoretical contradiction. Harvey’s theory is an attempt to dignify the emptiness left behind after relentless criticism of the contradiction. And there is a sense that both theorists would silently have to appeal to some sort of force to achieve their cosmopolitan order. This would be either the Weltstaat which Kant wanted to avoid, and which Held wants to avoid mentioning, or the revolutionary praxis which Harvey wants to avoid mentioning. As cosmopolitan theorists they are right to avoid mentioning force, for force, or will, or power—unless it is that of God or the gods—can never be a principle of a higher city. But without force there is simply no necessity in anything either Held or Harvey says, unless we consider them to be merely writing scripture for rival atheistic religious cults.

The confusion Held and Harvey could cause us can only be avoided if we see that cosmopolitanism, in its older and proper form, distinguished a higher and a lower city, and claimed that the higher city was ‘not of this world’, even if it was in some sense in the world and of it. The higher city was a community of the wise, or a community of the faithful, and so excluded those who were not wise, or those who were not faithful. What modern cosmopolitans want is the destruction of the distinction between the higher and the lower city, so that all men—without regard to wisdom or faith—may be members of one city. But they also want this city to be in some sense a higher city, and this requires them to restore the distinction between higher and lower which they reject. This contradiction is a consequence of adopting an atheistic metaphysics. For without God, or the gods, there is no meaningful higher city to which men can aspire: there is only the one and only city, the city of all cities, which is a totality, and contains good and bad alike. The older
cosmopolitans—whether Stoic or Christian, and even at times Kantian—recognised that the higher city will be identical with the lower city only at the end of history. Until then, and without God, and for us, it remains only an ideal of no necessity.

The contradiction can be stated in short order. Modern cosmopolitans postulate the existence of two cities, and then postulate the existence of only one. This contradiction is so blatant that it may seem remarkable that there is such a thing as modern cosmopolitanism. That there is such a thing is because modern cosmopolitans treat this contradiction as a difficulty rather than as a demonstration of impossibility. Modern cosmopolitan theorists should ask, ‘Is cosmopolitanism possible given its contradiction?’ to which the answer would be, ‘No’. But instead they ask, ‘How is cosmopolitanism possible given its apparent contradictions?’ to which their answer is, ‘By some form of compromise’. Which can then be written about *ad infinitum* in terms of a ‘layered’, or ‘moderate’, or ‘partial’, or ‘balanced’ cosmopolitanism. No amount of adjectival cosmopolitanism is ever going to conceal the contradiction. Scheffler says that cosmopolitanism at first seems either ‘plutitudinous’ or ‘implausible’. But it is both plutitudinous and implausible—because it is fundamentally contradictory.

Only theistic cosmopolitanism resolves the contradiction. For it is only if one has a conception of God or the gods that one can reconcile the universal and the particular. And this is because a god embodies both law and power. The irony of atheism is that it is Manichaean: for law and power fall apart when only ‘of this world’. All modern political theories in the absence of God emphasise either the priority of law over power or the priority of power over law. Consider Kant and Nietzsche; consider Kelsen and Schmitt; consider Rawls and, say, Geuss. If one is cosmopolitan and emphasises law over power, then one has an empty ideal ‘which exists God knows where—or, rather
of which we can very well say that we know where it exists, namely in the errors of a one-sided and empty ratiocination’.\textsuperscript{45} In which case cosmopolitanism is an empty, abstract, forlorn hope.\textsuperscript{46} But if one emphasises power over law—as any practical cosmopolitan eventually has to do—then the ideal is, as critics of cosmopolitanism always say, imperial rather than cosmopolitan.\textsuperscript{47} In which cosmopolitanism establishes not a higher city, but only a vast lower city, like the Rome of St. Augustine. Modern cosmopolitans are those of us who think that that the city of earth is the city of god, or should be, or must be. They repeat Constantine’s error. But Constantine had an excuse, for in his world, law and power were one, derived from God. Modern cosmopolitans have no excuse for their error, since in their world, law and power are theoretical antitheses: and it is only hope which leads them mistakenly to call the impossibility of reconciling the universal and the particular a difficulty, and to continue writing about cosmopolitanism as if its contradictions can be overcome.

Nozick wrote that “a philosophical argument is an attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants to believe it or not”.\textsuperscript{48} And I think that philosophical argument here—brought to consciousness by historical analogy—indicates that modern cosmopolitanism is impossible, whether we want to believe it or not.
NOTES


9. ‘Philo or his Stoic sources must have got the world from somewhere and the Cynics were renowned for their verbal resourcefulness, including coinages.’ John Moles, ‘The Cynics’, in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* eds. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 424.


The latest view is that it is difficult to systematise references to the ‘kingdom’ as, say, Oscar Cullman attempted. See *Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament* eds. Horst Balz and Gerhard Schneider (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1990), Vol. I, p. 205.


Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense


25 For the view that the Kingdom of Ends was metaphysical, see Katrin Flikshuh, ‘Kant’s Kingdom of Ends: Metaphysical not Political’ in Jens Timmermans ed. *Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and for the view it was political, see Christine Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).


27 This is something which recognised by many modern cosmopolitan theorists and then forgotten. The most distinctive instance of this I have come across is Lu, who recognises the ‘duality’, but, after recognising it (only as a difficulty), assumes that a will-to-overcome-difficulty is sufficient to overcome it. See Catherine Lu, ‘The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism’, *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 8 (2000), pp. 244-67, at p. 257.


30 For the policies, see *ibid.*, pp. 249-52. Held’s style is almost continually if ambiguously stipulative. E.g., in relation to Islam he says: ‘Like all major cultures, Islam can find, internally, the resources to meet cosmopolitan ideas and aspirations.’ (p. 22) This assertion is typical of his style: for it sounds like a possibility (Islam may find the resources) but also like a command (Islam has to find them). Held is not alone in this. Most modern cosmopolitan theorists have an ambiguously indicative-subjunctive-imperative style.


C.f. Nagel: ‘The most likely path towards some version of global justice is through the creation of patently unjust and illegitimate global structures of power that are tolerable to the interests of the most powerful current states’. Quoted in Bartelson, Visions of World Community, p. 34.


For ‘implausible’ and ‘platitudinous’ see Scheffler, ‘Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism’, p. 262.


This supports Beiner’s comment, ‘Scratch a cosmopolitan and you’ll find an imperialist just below the surface,’ quoted in Lu, ‘The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism’, p. 251. It is not hard to find an imperial (or imperative) tone in, say, Brian Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, Global Justice eds. Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer in Nomos (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 12-66, or in works by Pogge and Nussbaum. But the imperative mood is usually ‘balanced and constrained’ by indicative and subjunctive moods.