Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense

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CONTEMPORARY COSMOPOLITANISM
IN THE LIGHT OF CLASSICAL
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Cosmopolitanism is one of the concepts that have occupied an important place in political theory since the end of the cold war. The collapse of the communist block was representing the emergence of an era in which humanity is no more divided into hostile camps. The euphoria occasioned by this unification and the great, if not vertiginous, progress in the communication technologies made it quite easy to talk about the unity of mankind beyond the political and cultural borders. Given the fact that the cosmopolitan theses have been frequently proposed in the philosophical and political debates, cosmopolitanism can legitimately claim to be an important part of the agenda of political theory. Nevertheless this currency held nowadays by cosmopolitanism is a recent phenomenon and especially when the 20th century is considered, the historical record of cosmopolitanism is not so heartening. ¹ Throughout its history, cosmopolitanism has usually appeared as a kind of political idealism; because of this, it has been usually condemned

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as being a wishful thinking or naivety when the pressure of political realities is strongly felt. And this also explains why the generation which experienced the traumas of 20th century (the collapse of empires, world wars, totalitarian ideologies ... etc.), could hardly tolerate naivety and permit it to be a factor in politics. Nonetheless the traumas are the products of time, and they, however great, are bound to change like everything within time. Accordingly, the attitude which dominated the political and international life during the Cold War and which discarded the “ought” for the sake of better addressing to the realities changed abruptly with the end of cold war.2 History, which never stops producing new configurations of “is” and “ought,” was giving rise to a new one in which “ought” is no more omitted for the necessities of “is.” Consequently, in today’s world, heralding a cosmopolitan world order, applauding its ideals and putting humanitarian values above the national borders and diplomatic practices is no more practically naïve, strategically imprudent and diplomatically perilous. Having left the 20th century with its calamities and catastrophes behind, humanity was facing the prospect of unity with hope and enthusiasm. The belief, especially in the period immediately following the end of Cold War, was so strong and the inspiration was so sweeping that even the ethnic cleansings, religious fanaticisms and terrorist attacks, flamed up at that period, did nothing but gave testimony to the necessity of world order based on cosmopolitan ideals.

The critical reading which cosmopolitanism, like many political concepts, deserves requires keeping enthusiasm at an arm’s length. Of course, this does not mean to sacrifice the sentimental dimensions of our consciousness which serve as openings to world-experience. Academically or not, one always starts with the personal experiences, and at this level one can easily associate with the cosmopolitan ideals and
values. Yet the critical reading requires more than this. This is especially so for cosmopolitanism which has long historical background and which, one way or another, has found a way to affect the philosophical and political imagination throughout this background. Therefore, we should take this historical background into account and realize the modifications and variations produced by it if we want to develop a critical reading of contemporary cosmopolitanism. This naturally entails to read cosmopolitanism as a political and philosophical tradition which dates back to the ancient Greek and to index its ideas, ideals and principles as the constellation of this tradition. This automatically brings us to the brink of [classical] political philosophy.

Before dealing with this aspect, before treating it as a tradition, it would be good for us to take a broader perspective and locate cosmopolitanism within a larger tradition from which it came into existence. In this sense, Heidegger can be a good starting point. To my knowledge, Heidegger did not directly deal with cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, his views on western metaphysics have important implications for our issue. The western metaphysics, according to him, can be defined as a tradition following the same thread even in the different guises from Socrates to Nietzsche. Within the context of this study, it suffices to point out that the revolutionary character of Heidegger’s thought mainly consists in his emphatic ability to show that the western metaphysics forgets Being (Seinvergessen): having fixed its attention on beings to such an extent as to forget Being, the western metaphysics has always mistaken the whole of beings as the Being itself. An attentive look does not miss the importance of this general ontological framework to understand the deadlocks that the cosmopolitan theses usually encounter: cosmopolitanism, especially in the debates with communitarianism, acts as if it has worked out the
dichotomy between universal and particulars; the problem that has distracted the western metaphysics since the antiquity.

To realize this problematic, we need only to take a closer look at the things which are put before us as universals. Upon a closer inspection, these universals turn out to be a particular which enjoys a wider scope [of validity or application] due to the historical circumstances. To solve this problem, namely to have a universal which is not a mere aggrandizement of the particular(s), we have to deal with the questions and concerns Heidegger highlighted under the title of Seinvergessen. Otherwise, our imagination cannot escape from the trap of dialectical impulse. Of course, dialectic is one of the intellectual tools indispensable to penetrate deeper into the historical reality. But the problem with dialectic is that the process it envisages usually comes to an end with the [arbitrary] will of the philosopher, namely when the historical reality is configured according to his taste. This also explains how easily the philosophical and theoretical formulations result in the dichotomies which usually appear as chicken-egg questions.

This general structure sheds light on the context in which cosmopolitanism is articulated. Cosmopolitan theses and arguments usually give rise to the communitarian responses or vice versa. In this context, cosmopolitans and communitarians present their views in mutually-exclusive forms. In order not to succumb to the mutually-exclusive readings which, in the long run, are sure to condemn our imagination to a deadlock, one should take an attitude which rejects the idea that one of the sides can hold a monopoly over truth. Rather than being concerned with “who says the truth?” namely “who wins the game?” it would be better for us to take this structure itself into account. Such an attitude compels one to give thought to the truth-claims of every part. From this, one can easily infer how important it is for cosmopolitanism to take seriously into
account the communitarian claims: the failure to do this can cause cosmopolitanism to cast its arguments into mutually-exclusive terms.  

Let us, therefore, dwell on some communitarian critiques. *Alienation* is one of them. According to communitarians, the social relations are constitutive for the self. A self without social relations is impossible; and these relations within which the self is embedded entail the social groups and a social space mediating them. Therefore, a public life, developed in the varying degrees and institutionalized in the different forms, is essential for the self. Such a constitutive role implies that without a proper public life, self cannot sustain itself. Considering this, we can conclude: the fall of public amounts to the same thing as the fall of self. However, it is clear that our global world which is usually presented as a *global village* necessarily envisages a vague public space: it spans such a vast geographical space that it has to become superficial. In wanting of the strong ties, strong attachments and the strong sentiments, the self has been given no option other than to be atomized. Here is the mass-man: stripped of its social ties and attachments and thus accorded with the imperatives of consumer capitalism, this mass-man ends up in a distant place from what genuine cosmopolitanism anticipates: indifference, lack of responsibility, treating other as a means rather than as an end in itself. And these are the basic parameters to urge the communitarians to look upon the life in our global village as infected with alienation. Of course, cosmopolitans have important answers to this charge, but let’s skip the details and turn our attention to another charge.

To start with, there are some crucial questions: do cosmopolitan ideas and ideals represent a trans-cultural and trans-political formation? Can they transcend every social, cultural and ideological commitment? Or are they the normative attitudes that have developed out of a particular cultural and
political setting? Do they run the risk of imposing a local perspective on the alien soils and minds? It can be argued that from the time of incursions of Hellenism into the Middle East to our age, cosmopolitanism has been in trouble to keep its distance from a [practical] interest. Suppose this granted, we can conclude that the cosmopolitan ideals and values, the initial impression notwithstanding, are hardly trans-political and trans-cultural; they are the expressions of certain cultural and political settings. Therefore, we can notice the danger inherent in cosmopolitanism: it can be used as a means in the service of a particular interest.

The charges of moral imperialism, of course, are to be taken seriously; yet this by no means prevents us from making reservations in the face of them. The charges are valuable in that they make us attentive to how the innocent acts can sometimes cause the unjust conditions. But being too assertive in this point can lead to moral relativism. What is disturbing in moral relativism is that its logic runs the risk of leading to the moral indifference even in the face of such extreme case as cannibalism or human sacrifice.8

This point is important in that it brought us to see the subterranean trends which are usually ignored: the uneasy relation of cosmopolitanism with liberalism, the uneasy relation which nowadays is overlooked under the shadow of global liberal culture. An attentive look can realize the tension between cosmopolitanism and liberalism. Here the concept of moral relativism is the key factor: does not moral relativism take its main impetus from liberalism? Is not the liberalism with its war against the theological, teleological and substantial worldviews the main responsible for the moral relativism? It is apparent that cosmopolitanism ought to keep moral relativism at a distance. Does not this distance affect the position of cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis liberalism? Why do we not find such a distance
between cosmopolitanism and liberalism in today’s debates on cosmopolitanism? What we experience today is a sort of combination of the two: they are found here and there hand in hand in dealing with an international problem or making a common cause against a local or a traditional custom.

To make these abstract suppositions more concrete, we can turn our attention to another concept: globalization. Today, the debates on cosmopolitanism seem to center on or run parallel to the development of globalization. Cosmopolitanism which was disdained as being unrealistic and impractical for the most part of 20th century, now seems to entrench itself, casting out the critiques by showing how history is on its side. In this sense, one may find astonishing how close to political realism cosmopolitanism can come: the formulation of a normative agenda that is related, if not dependent on, the existing power relations. But for the sake of brevity, let’s try to look at the center of the matter.

I think this center is the association of cosmopolitanism with liberalism, and many of the critiques leveled against cosmopolitanism derive from this association. Therefore, a case for distinction between liberalism and cosmopolitanism is necessary. But how? To take a look at the historical background of cosmopolitanism can help us in this regard. Two philosophical figures immediately rise to prominence in this background: Diogenes the Cynic and Kant. One may wonder what the motivation in taking them together is. Whatever can be said about them, it is clear that they represent two historical turning points. In the case of these philosophers, the emergence of cosmopolitanism coincided with the great social, political and institutional upheavals. Can the emergence of cosmopolitanism at these historical circumstances be taken merely as a coincidence? I do not think so. Kant’s *ius cosmopoliticum*, which plays a critical role in the Kantian
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edifice, came to the agenda when the need for a new social code to organize relations among states was strongly felt. At that time, the European history was experiencing the collapse of feudal codes, the displacement of ecclesiastical organizations by a state bureaucracy and the rise of bourgeoisie alongside the nation-states. In such moments of great upheavals, the existing structure of social norms and codes is frustrated by the “new” which frequently visits the customary and ordinary and which is no more easily treated as an exception. It is exactly at this turning point when the need for the new social code was being urgently felt that Kant’s *ius cosmopoliticum* appeared along with Grotius and others. This also explains why we so frequently come across a reference to Kant even in the contemporary debates on cosmopolitanism.

Therefore, it seems in place to focus on that which we can find in Kant’s cosmopolitanism but which we cannot in today’s liberal cosmopolitanism. This is *teleology* or the teleological conceptualization of history. In Kant’s formulation, there is an open reference to the idea of “perfection.” According to Kant’s schema, history is moved by a plan which the actors cannot discern. This hidden plan stages dramas as it unfolds itself in an increasingly complex institutional forms. Looked within, the process envisaged by this plan seems to run from one domination to another. But when looked from afar, the careful thinker (the philosopher) can see that there is an end point: the process supposes a point of culmination which retrospectively gives meaning to all previous stages and sufferings. This is the moment when humanity, hitting one destruction after another, finally learns [the lessons of] the mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence. Therefore, *ius cosmopoliticum* or perpetual peace signifies a moment of culmination, a moment of perfection in history.
I think the keyword here is perfection. Even if through the agency of history, a kind of perfection is supposed in Kant’s scheme. Needless to say, this teleological perspective (the supposition of an end point in the long course of time) is what is missing in the modern thought in general and in the contemporary cosmopolitanism in particular. Here are the corner stones in the emergence of modern thought: the mechanical conceptualization of universe, the disappearance of miracle as a theological and political phenomenon, the placement of nature (the realm of never-ending repetition or chaos) in an inferior position than history (the realm of reason). It is clear that these are not very friendly to a teleological conceptualization of human relations.

Should cosmopolitanism presuppose or embrace such a perfection? This is a difficult question for us who solve the tension between representation and virtue in favor of the former. There is nothing surprising in this favor because the perfection would usually embody a messianic teleology or it would presuppose a kind of discrimination among the equal human-beings, or both at once. Being an approach aiming at the disappearance of discrimination, cosmopolitanism can hardly be on good terms with the idea of perfection. Nevertheless, in this conclusion, a lot depends on how we define perfection and what we understand by it. Moreover, focusing too much on the tension between representation and perfection or on the tension between cosmopolitanism and perfection, do we not run the risk of omitting another tension: the tension between representation and cosmopolitanism? Now the tides of globalization are so strong that we tend to uncritically assume the association between democracy and cosmopolitanism. Yet this does not need to blur the tension inherent in the relationship between cosmopolitanism and democracy. Because of its character, habit and attitude, *demos* is usually closer to patriotism than
to cosmopolitanism. This can be easily proved by looking at the tendencies in the societies in which the political culture is not advanced, namely in societies in which the demos does not yet take any decisive step in the direction of perfection. In this sort of societies, democratization goes hand in hand with the ethnic conflicts and religious fanaticism.

Our theme is neither the theories nor the paradoxes of democracy; so we can focus on cosmopolitanism by bypassing them. Interdependence among nations, the density of the relations taking place on the global scale, the development of common habits and attitudes across the globe, sharing the similar, if not the same, symbolic and material conditions... all these are crucial signs to look upon the important part of humanity as a demos (nowadays it becomes customary to refer to the world population as the inhabitants of global village). Nevertheless, we must admit that the life of the global demos is a far cry from a genuine cosmopolitan culture. The basic characteristics of the human condition described as the global demos is the spread of basic parameters of consumer society across the world. Therefore we have at our hand two interrelated facts: the world takes more and more a cosmopolitan outlook, yet this outlook hardly goes beyond the economical, diplomatic and financial interdependence among peoples. Accordingly, the amount of relations among nations has so increased that no body can deny the global trends (the globalization of life); but this by no means manages to create a cosmopolitan world culture which can unite the demos of our global village through the substantial sympathies and attachments.

Considering this, we come to another important point: global governance. Now, it is plausible to say that we have reached the stage of global governance. But the phenomenon of global governance is far away from arousing euphoria. The
increasing possibility of unification of humanity under the single organizational structure can lead either to inefficiency (the endless series of civil war on the global scale) or it can achieve an unthinkable efficiency so that it causes an international tyranny. Today, no body can deny that we are affected by the problems transcending the national borders and that we have more sophisticated and efficient facilities at our disposal than those provided by the national states. Therefore, that we are experiencing the phenomenon of global governance is a fact. Yet without a genuine cosmopolitan culture, this global governance is nothing other than the spread of what Foucault called governmentality over the entire world. Seeing the link between global governance and governmentality, we catch the glimpse of the fact that in our cosmopolitan world order, what we stand witness is less the rise of civilization based on global hospitality than a domination of a technique deployed by a will to power operating now globally. This is the theme which is thoroughly studied by Adorno (Dialectic of Enlightenment) and Heidegger (Question Concerning Technology).12

Putting all these side by side, we see two important points which should be taken into account in our discussion of cosmopolitanism. One is the danger of global tyranny which is made possible by the undreamed heights of modern technology (global governance). The other is the preponderance of the global demos whose members, though displaying an increasing homogeneity, are mainly motivated by the desire to treat other as a means (consumer capitalism). To these points, we can add another one: increasing technological advancement in the techniques of rule and the institutional complexity resulted from it make it difficult to determine the responsible for the authority relations. In such an increasingly complex bureaucratic structure as our global governance, the “who” in the question of “who
is the sovereign?” or “who is responsible for using the power?” becomes highly insensible.

It is therefore not too much to say that the coming of the cosmopolitan world order does not dispel the worries about the global governance. In our age, the world history seems to make head in the cosmopolitan direction, which means that the power relations support the cosmopolitan ideals. Then, it is exactly at this age that cosmopolitanism stands in need of a critical stance more than ever: the more one succumbs to the critical reading of cosmopolitanism, the more one feels the necessity of making a distinction between cosmopolitanism affected by the global govermentality and genuine cosmopolitanism challenging the social codes and customs.

Such a case of distinction brings a philosophical figure, to whom we referred earlier, to our attention: Diogenes the Cynic. In order to see cosmopolitanism in its original form and to realize the potential of classical political philosophy, let’s concentrate on Diogenes the Cynic. It is not surprising to see that Diogenes’s uttering his being a world citizen coincides with a certain historical stages in the life of polis: the crisis and decline of city-state. Polis points to a progress in the human history through which the blood-ties and the customs of ancestral life had been replaced by a public spirit. What is distinguishing about this spirit is that it enforces its members to consider each other as similar and equal.

Diogenes appeared exactly at the moment when the ideological, institutional and geographical setting of city-state was in trouble to contain this public spirit within its limits. It is as if a universalism, found as a germ at the dawn of city-state and flourished within its institutional setting, was trying to unfold itself into another form (imperial). The dramatic moment came when the existing structure could not contain the germ which had already become a tree. So, this makes clear that contrary
to the initial impression, there is not a break but continuation between *polis* and *cosmopolis*. But this polis which emerged as a consequence of imperial dominion is closer to being a *megapolis* than to being *cosmopolis*. Here we come to a vital point: what is the difference between these two?

The famous encounter of two historical cosmopolitan figures, Alexander the Great and Diogenes the Cynic, has a lot to say about what we are trying to sketch so far. At that time, Alexander was at the top of an empire. Empire, generally speaking, is a mechanism designed to rule; this mechanism points to a governance larger than the scope of city-state. I do not want to ignore the contributions of Hellenism in the Middle East, neither do I suspect the cosmopolitan ideals motivating Alexander. Yet it is hard to deny the close relationship between the empire as a political structure and the cosmopolitanism finding its expression within this structure. And we come to understand in what sense the *cosmopolis* envisaged by an empire is a mere *megapolis*.

Turning our attention from Alexander to Diogenes, we can understand the importance of classical political philosophy for cosmopolitanism. To start with, it is a good place to concentrate on the Diogenes’s position in the face of polis. Of course, Diogenes carried the position of philosopher in the face polis to the extreme heights; but this should not make us miss the point: even in varying degrees and in different forms, the position in question is what all philosophers [should] share in common. The most defining characteristic of the relationship between polis and philosopher is the tension. Or it should be so. One may ask why? The reason for this can be found within the very definition of philosophy: *the search for truth*. It is necessary, therefore, for philosophy to attempt to replace the opinions with truth. But every polis, the *megapoli*es included, presupposes the opinions. The heart of polis is pulsed with
the opinions however noble. Therefore, the philosopher, who cannot help challenging opinions, is a threat to polis. Yet the relationship cannot be cast into the mutually exclusive terms. Let’s try to substantiate this claim.

The polis ushered in the birth of philosophy. The birth of polis preceded that of philosophy: without the transformation effected by the coming of polis, there would be no philosophy. For a search for truth to be possible, the ancestral myths and faith propping them should be pushed back. Where the myths hold a strong reign, the reason cannot find a place to pursue truth and the philosopher cannot come to life. The birth of polis, in this sense, is decisive for the philosopher. It is not therefore too much to say that the philosopher owes too much to the polis. Yet the philosopher cannot rest satisfied with this; to the extent that he is in the search for truth, he one way or another would clash with the opinions upon which the polis is based. This explains why the philosopher becomes a threat to the polis; but this also shows the complexity of the relationship between the polis and philosopher. Philosopher should at once thank to and pose a challenge to polis. But we have so far looked at the matter from the side of philosopher. What is the situation of polis in the face of philosophy? The raison d’être of polis is good life; so it cannot blind itself to the possibilities of “better life.” It is clear that these possibilities are laid open only by a figure who is already a part of the polis but who also manages to keep himself at a distance to it: philosopher.

Thus we arrive at the land of classical political philosophy. What is the best regime? What are the conditions of justice? Is there any natural right?... These are the well-known questions of classical political philosophy. A closer examination immediately reveals how important these questions are to understand modern cosmopolitanism. To appreciate this, we should take a deeper glance at the implications of the
relationship between philosopher and polis. Motivated by the desire to search for truth, the philosopher tries to turn his back to the polis [political life] where the contingencies and accidental incidences set the stage and where the power and opinions rather than truth prevail. It is exactly at this point that we come to realize that the emergence of [classical] political philosophy links these apparently independent, if not mutually exclusive, moments together.

To arrive at truth, one must start with the opinions. This is what the “cave” metaphor narrates so well: there must be an ascend (transcendence) if the truth is aimed. But this also points to another fact that the philosopher can embark on his voyage only by starting with the polis. Nevertheless, this voyage, to a certain extent, is what polis itself ought to participate in. Polis, like philosopher, cannot rest satisfied with the level of opinions; in this regard, its position is similar to the philosopher, or at least it ought to be so. Otherwise polis runs the risk of becoming what it attempted to replace: it destructs the ancestral myths but puts in their stead the rational ones; and it usually plunges into the imperial adventures, appearing to the outsiders as a “gang of robbers” what ever the notion of justice prevails within.¹⁹

The impetus of transcendence, namely the desire to leave the cave behind is felt most strongly when the fact is faced that the customs of polis are not natural ones. This is occasioned by means of encountering other customs that had gained currency in other societies. Therefore, the [classical] political philosopher can be conceived as the one who is troubled by the fragmentary character of truth within the communal settings. Accordingly, he is the one who tries to transcend this realm of fragmentation.

I think that these remarks lay open the relationship, or even the correlation, between the philosopher and cosmopolitanism. A comparison with another oft-cited cosmopolitan figure (the merchant visiting the foreign lands) would provide for us the
crucial insights in this regard. Through his visits to the foreign lands, the merchant also experiences the fragmentary character of truth prevailing in different societies. Indeed, he ought to act according to this fragmentary character unless he does not want to lose his gain. Yet the motivation in trade is the benefit expected from the other. So the merchant cannot help treating the other as a means. Maybe, this explains why our global cosmopolitan world order, based on the extremely developed forms of trade, tourism and fashion, is still far from creating a genuine cosmopolitan culture.

If we do not take the geographical spread of trade, governance and communication enough, we more readily make ourselves open to that which lies at the center of cosmopolitanism and which is the essence of every cosmopolitan expression: treating the other not as a means but as an end in itself. It is therefore plausible to say that cosmopolitanism is not merely a horizontal act (covering the entire world with the same values, principles and ideals); but it also involves a moment of transcendence through which these values and principles are put under critical examination. The aim of this transcendence is to save these principles and values from the reification which can turn them into an ideological element serving a [particular] practical interest. A [particular] practical interest can always be found lying in ambush to prey on the noble ideas. So it can be alleged that the critical attitude ought to be the essential component of cosmopolitanism.

This vertical dimension (the moment of transcendence) of cosmopolitanism is more easily realized when we take into account the questions and concerns raised by the classical political philosophy. Since the quality of the principles (the vertical moment) is as much important as their scope of validity (the horizontal moment), we had better start by asking questions about the regime in which the cosmopolitan ideals find their most rigorous expression.
NOTES

1 After the Second World War, the political idealism, with which cosmopolitanism is closely associated, was held as one of the main responsible for the war. Idealism is not only dangerous in the political life; it is also detrimental to the scientific progress. Hence, E. H. Carr’s famous formulation suggests that idealism is the sign of the infantile character of a science. According to him, the idealist approach can dominate at the early stages of an academic discipline; but as this discipline grows mature, the focus of attention shifts from “what should be done?” to “what is?”. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’s Crisis, p. 8.

2 We should add that even during the Cold War, there appeared important developments as regards cosmopolitanism. Therefore, the end of cold war is not so much a break as a continuation, albeit in the accelerated forms, of the process. “…the narrowly state-centered focus of these organizations was remedied or supplemented by more people-oriented agreements, especially the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (and a series of later, related documents). These and similar developments have engendered a widespread hope that humankind may now –or at least soon- be ready for the adoption of a global cosmopolitan ethics seen as a framework buttressing and undergirding existing legal provisions.” Fred Dallmayr, “Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political,” in Political Theory, Political Theory, vol. 31, no. 3, 2003. p. 422.

3 It is not difficult to find a link between cosmopolitanism and the planetary rule of the will to power which Heidegger envisages as the direct outcome of western metaphysics. This planetary rule gives rise to two options: global tyranny (sham cosmopolitanism) or genuine cosmopolitanism. If this planetary rule does not want to turn out to be the global tyrant, it has to elaborate a cosmopolitanism which is saved from the negative effects of this planetary rule. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism, because of its condemning the political subject to the loose allegiances, runs the risk of leading to political inactivity and irresponsibility. Therefore, when confronted with the practical matters, cosmopolitanism seems to be trapped with a difficult choice: either political inactivity (just like the beautiful soul in Hegel’s scheme) or political Übermensch. Heidegger’s critical reading of Übermensch reveals the link between the will to power on planetary level and the man as övermensch: “Der Übermensch is der höchste Gestalt des reinsten Willens zur Macht... Der Übermensch , der unbedingte Herrschaft der reinen Macht, ist der Sinn des einzig Seinden, d.h. der

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Erde... Der Übermensch läßt den Menschen der bisherigen Werte einfach hinter sich, übergeht ihn und verlegt die Rechtfertigung aller Rechte und die Setzung aller Rechte in das Machten der reinen Macht.” Heidegger, Nietzsche, pp. 39-40. But this is also the blind point of Heidegger. In this age of planetary rule, the call of Being cannot be responded by the Nazi figure because of his or her particularistic character; it can be responded more adequately by a cosmopolitan figure. Maybe this is one of the reasons which motivated latter Heidegger to turn his attention to the East-West dialogue: “Appalled by the prospect of an approaching spiritual unity of the planet on the lowest level of humanly empty, calculating, technical thought, wrought by the victory of Western technology, Heidegger tried to prepare the ground, a possible common but deeper ground for the meeting of East and West in dialogue. The ground Heidegger tried to prepare was to make it possible for each side to preserve something of its own noble depths while joining with the other to forge the unified humanity imposed upon us ... history? Destiny? The gods?” “the prescientific world and historicism: some reflections on Strauss, Heidegger, and Husserl,” Lawrence Berns, “The Prescientific World and Historicism: Some reflections on Strauss, Heidegger, and Husserl,” in Leo Strauss’s Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, Alan Udoff (ed.), L. Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991, p. 177.

4 This can be clearly seen in today’s arguments deployed for asserting cosmopolitan thesis. For example, in Held’s book, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, we encounter such an approach. The existing national and cultural borders are contingent, if not completely outdated, historical realities. Because of this, they are not substantial so as to form a sound obstacle before the universal claims which take humanity as a whole and thus transcend the existing borders. But the same line of argument can be quite easily turned against the cosmopolitanism. The world-ethics transcending the localities is itself the production of historically contingent factors. Therefore, in order to assert a universal ethics surpassing the particular ones because of their arbitrary character, one needs more ontologically substantial basis than the certain configuration of historical forces (globalization). David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals, Realities, and Deficits, p. 40.

5 This is exactly the case of Hegel and Marx. In their approaches, the dialectical movement stops even if there are materials upon which the dialectic can work, therefore in which there is still potential to produce history. But this is not specific to dialectic. To stop the
philosophical imagination before the possibilities are exhausted can be said to be the general characteristics of political philosopher. Hobbes’s unwillingness to the carry the contract to its logical conclusions, namely to an international covenant and an international Leviathan above the particular states can be given as another example. But what is important here is to see this not as a fault of this or that philosopher but to see it as a tradition. In this sense, Gregory Stone’s article is illuminating: “The whole premise of Dante’s Monarchy is that there is a fundamental flaw in Aristotelian-Thomist political theory, which brings the life of the state to a premature end before it ever comes to possess its true nature, the attainment of its telos. By setting the limits of the polis at the extent of the city (Aristotle) or the kingdom (Aquinas), Dante’s predecessors are themselves, on this issue at least, sodomites. For sodomy is, in essence, the unnatural delimitation of the boundaries of the community. Sodomy is a contraceptive political ideology that prevents the growing polis from reaching its natural end.” Gregory B. Stone, “Sodomy, Diversity, Cosmopolitanism: Dante and the Limits of the Polis, Dante Studies, no: 123 (2005), p. 115.

This also holds true for communitarianism. It should also engage in this kind of conversation. That a cosmopolitan like Brian Barry formulated an apparently oxymoronic conceptual pair, “cosmopolitan nationalism” is an crucial sign of the fact that some sorts of intermingling has already taken place. “Nationalism is Janus faced. Looking in one direction, it is an ideological construct in the sense of Marx and Engels: an obfuscatory idealization of a sordid reality. This is the form of nationalism I have been addressing until now. I must now add that it has a more benign face. In this form, it is essential to the successful operation of a liberal democratic polity... we may say that nationalism of this form is required by cosmopolitanism.” Brian Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique,” in NOMOS Volume XLI: Global Justice, p. 53.

“No other Greek system was so well qualified as Stoicism to appeal to the native virtues of self-control, devotion to duty and the public spirit in which the Roman took a special pride, and no political conception was so well qualified as the Stoic world-state to introduce some measure of idealism into too sordid business of Roman conquest.” p. 151. “Doubtless also the Stoic world-state lent itself easily to a kind of sentimental imperialism which enabled the conquerors to imagine that they were assuming the white man’s burden and where bringing

8 Cannibalism and human sacrifice are two main extreme cases put before the moral relativist. According to the opponents of moral relativism, the indifference suggested by moral relativism should be sustained in the face of these extreme cases if one is loyal to the underlying presumption forming the basis of moral relativism. But one note of caution in this regard seems to be in place: studying the social functions of cannibalism and human sacrifice within a certain community and taking moral neutrality in the face of them are two different things. So taking a moral position against them can by no means be taken as ignoring their social function.

9 “Various attempts, most notably by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and the Saxon Samuel Pufendorf, had been made during the seventeenth century to redefine the ancient Roman concept of the law of nations (*ius gentium*) so as to create an international law capable of restraining the activities of the European powers. But, as Kant also observed, these men—whom he described collectively as ‘sorry comforters’—had done nothing to remedy the situation… As Kant recognized, the only possible means to control the behavior of states in international arena would be to create an international political order. Then, and only then, would there exist some agency with the power to sustain an international legal community.” p. 9 Anthony Pagden, “The Genesis of Governance and Enlightenment Conceptions of the Cosmopolitan World Order,” in *International Social Science Journal*, v. 50, 1998.

10 This teleological view is found not only in Kantian cosmopolitanism. It can also be found in another cosmopolitanism: stoicism. Indeed, the rejection of teleological world-view is a recent phenomenon in the history of thought. To see the Stoicism effect in this regard see: T. H. Irwin, “Stoic Naturalism and Its Critics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, p. 353. But this subject is a little complex. If we can talk about the teleology in Stoicism, it is also possible to talk about another principle in it: eternal recurrence. That this principle is in a certain tension with teleology is certain. For “the eternal recurrence” in Stoicism, see R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 37-39.

11 A nice of illustration of this point can be found in Mehta’s article: “What are, in other words, the limits of hybridization – a familiar self-description of cosmopolitans? Can hybridization be extended to the deepest issues that give our lives the purpose we think it has, or will it extend only to those activities that dance at the surface of our lives
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(and that may be appropriately defined by the image of consumption) – the restaurants we visit, the movies we see, the carpets we drape our floors with, and so on. What does the cosmopolitan really put at risk?” p. 628. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Cosmopolitanism and the Circle of Reason,” Political Theory, vol: 28, no. 5, 2000.

One may ask to what extent it is right to criticize and blame technology. According to some, technology, along with the side effects, contains some positive elements for freedom and human subjectivity. For example, Connolly stresses that the vertiginous speed that today’s technology makes us enjoy has important positive results for cosmopolitanism if cosmopolitanism is to escape from the totalizing and hegemonic character of Kantian universal. Although this line of argument needs a careful elaboration than can be done in a footnote, it is in place to have brief glance at that: “Speed can be dangerous. At a certain point of acceleration, it jeopardizes freedom and shortens the time in which to engage ecological issues. But the crawl of slow time contains injuries, dangers, and repressive tendencies too. It may be wise therefore to explore speed as an ambiguous medium that contains some positive possibilities... The politics to pluralize hegemonic culture along several dimensions and the politics to fundamentalize hegemonic identities form two contending responses to late-modern speed... it also becomes clear why democratic pluralists must embrace the positive potentialities of speed while working to attenuate its most dangerous effects.” William E. Connolly, “Speed, Concentric Cultures and Cosmopolitanism,” in Political Theory, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2000, p. 598.

For a useful discussion of Diogenes the Cynic in this context, see Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in The Cosmopolitan Reader, p. 157.

From the perspective of cosmopolitanism, the city-state represents a particularism. Of course, it is a sort of particularity. But leaving the matter at this point seems to do injustice to city-state. It was an important tool to breaking up the particular world-views and bringing about a public space in which certain amount of population, regardless of their particular characteristics, can participate in. This Jean-Pierre Vernant expresses clearly: “Le courant démocratique va plus loin; il définit tous le citoyens, en tant que tells, sans consideration de fortune ni de vertu, comme des égaux ayant exactement les mêmes droits à participer à tous les aspects de la vie publique.” Jean-Pierre Vernant, Les Origines de la Penseé Grecque.
Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense

15 To realize some points of continuation in the transformation of city-state into the empire, see Sabine: “Great as is the gap between this conception of a World-wide society of autonomous individuals and the moral intimacy of city-state, the two are not wholly discrepant. It would be truer to say that the philosophy of the Hellenistic age tried to Project upon a cosmic field ideals which, in their first appearance, were confined within the limits of the city.” Sabine, *Ibid*, p. 143.

16 In this sense, one surmises the similarities between the global governance and imperial rule. The term “empire” is what the critiques of global governance usually use. In this sense, it is not mere a coincidence that one of the most influential books which put the global governance of our age under the critical scrutiny is entitled “Empire.” Negri and Hardt, *Empire*. For this point see especially pp. 18-22.

17 To understand this point, it is essential to take into account the difference between Cynics (and also early Stoics) and later Stoics: while in the Roman stoics, the imperial virtues and characteristics are preponderant, the reluctance, if not abhorrence, in the face of public life and authority is the brand of Cynics and early Stoics. “This conception of World-wide citizenship involved important consequences and had a distinguished history in Stoicism, but this was due chiefly to the positive meaning which the Stoics gave it. What the Cynics emphasized was its negative side: primitivism, the abolition of civic and social ties and of all restriction except those that arise from the wise man’s sense of duty. The protest of the Cynic against social convention was a doctrine of the return to nature in the most nihilist sense of the term.” Sabine, *Ibid.*, p. 137.

18 Fort this point, see Strauss’s article, “What is Political Philosophy”. “Philosophy, as quest for wisdom, is quest for universal knowledge, for knowledge of the whole… Of philosophy thus understood, political philosophy is a branch. Political philosophy will then be attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political things by knowledge of the nature of political things.” Leo Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?” *An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays*, pp. 4-5.

19 The term is borrowed from Leo Strauss.
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